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C H A P T E R - I 
(a) Hegel ' s Life, and Works » 
George Wilhelm Fr iedr ich Hegel was torn a t S t u t t g a r t 
on 27th August, 1770, i n the Duchy of Wurttemberg, His l i fespan 
(1770-1831) coincided with the most eventful period i n modern 
h i s t o r y . In philosophy, p o l i t i c s * and l i t e r a t u r e , humanity 
was enriched with a galaxy of b r i l l i a n t men of genius and Hegel 
occuiped a prominent place amongst them during h i s l i f e t ime. 
He devested himself to the task of sustained r e f l ec t ion on 
ideas as well as h i s t o r i c a l movements. Hegel i s commonly 
connected with P rus s i a , because he spent h i s l a t e r years 
in Ber l in , and also because he gave an over e n t h u s i a s t i c 
ph i losophica l endorsement to the Prussian s t a t e which 
was by no means a very benign government. However, h i s 
ances tors had long been connected with Swabia, and Hegel was 
hence a south German, His family was one of the many refugee 
p r o t e s t a n t famil ies which had fled from Austr ia to 
wurttemberg during the persecut ions of the coutiter-Reformation. 
Various members of h i s family were Craftsman, Of f i c i a l s , 
Scholars , and p a s t o r s . His fa ther , George Ludwig Hegel, was 
a minor f i s ca l o f f i c i a l in the service of the Duke of 
wurttemberg. Hegel was highly impresseu by h i s family atmosphere 
and t h i s fact comes out in Hegel 's phi losophical w r i t i n g s . 
in which there are idealized portraits of its various members. 
Accordiog to Hegel, Family is the immediate Ethical Substance, 
Hegel had got his basic schooling at the Gymnasium of 
Stuttgast at the age of seven. Here he seciared his possession 
of contemporary learning and 'enlightenment' by an elaborate 
system of notes and extracts. It also explains the way in 
which Greek thought, and literature at that time mainly 
represented by Sophocles' plays and the .Socratic dialogues, 
came to pass through his mind. One might say that Hegel 
stands out among the great modern philosophers as one who 
most thoroxighly absorbed and understood the Greek thought. 
In 1788, at the age of eighteen, Hegel left the 
Stuttgaut Gymnasium and entered the theological Institute 
at Tubingen University, where he was a student for five 
years. Here he made his friendship with the poet^Friedrich 
Holderlin and the Philosopher Rebelling. The tiieology 
thovight at the Institute exercised a great impact on the 
young men. Its rationalistic theistic proofs subdued 
their soaring spirits. Hegel was afterwards to characterise 
their doctrine rather ambivalently as 'a theology of the 
Understanding•. 
1. J.N, Findlay, Heaeli A Re-exaaination (Longon: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1970), p. 28, 
Hegel's stay at Tubingen was animated by the 
^ut i3r«ais of the French Revolution, rie sang the Marseillaise, 
made seditious speeches, alarming the officials of the Duke, 
At a lat«r stage of his life^Hegel reacted strongly against 
the negative and merely abstract ideals of the Revolution. 
In The Phenomenology of Spirit, he says, 'Universal freedom 
can produce neither a positive achievement nor a deed •., it 
is merely the rage and fury of disappearance and destruction. 
He came to believe that true freedom can be achieved only in 
the laws and usagesof some concrete community, in which 
2 
alone the individual can find himself. 
Prom 1793 to 1800, Hegel began to develop his own 
ideas. After graduating in 1793, he held two tutorial 
positions, the first not too congenial, with an aristocratic 
Bernese family and the second,more happily, in the house-
hold of a Frankfurt merchant in 1796. Furti»er he engaged 
hiMself in the study of Kant's ethical writings and of 
his Religion Within the Bounds of Mere Reason. He also 
absorbed Fichte's early writings on 'theory of knowledge* 
and 'theory of morals' which coincided with the latter's 
«^ Ibid., p. 29. 
Jena Professorship. Hegel also read Schelling's early 
essays on the Philosophy of Nature (1797) and his Systems 
of Transcendental Idealism (1800), and corresponded 
frequently with Schelling throughout this period. Hegel 
too^like most philosophers of his time, was influenced by 
Spinoza with often surprising consequences. 
However, it mvist be said that Hegel developed his 
ideas, not so much in reaction to the opinions of other 
philosophers — past or contenqporary — as in deep roedj^tings 
on the meaning of that version of the Christian religion 
which he had been exposed to at Tubingen. We may say that 
in contrast to Fichte who approached the Absolute through 
morality, and Schelling whose path to the Absolute lay 
through art, Hegel approached his idea of the Absolute 
through religion. For Hegel, the message of Christianity 
was 'essentially* one with the moral law as set forth by 
Kant. Hegel, like many later thinkers, was unwilling to 
ascribe the positivity to the founder of Christianity, 
Hegel was inclined to attribute it to the restricted 
horizons of the time and to the Crassness of the Jews, in 
the Christian story of the Incarnation, Passion and 
Resurrection of Christ, Hegel came to see a symbolic 
3. Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
expression of his central thesis that what is absolute and 
spiritual can emerge only in painful triumph over what seems 
alien and recalcitrant. In fact, Hegel may be said to have 
infused the notions of Christianity into the very character 
of his argvanents, At the end of his Frankfurt period Hegel 
produced a first outline of bis system, v*iich already 
contains the three divisions of the subsequent Encvclooedia; 
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a Logic, a Philosophy of Nature and a Philosophy of Spirit. 
At the beginning of 1801, fie joined his friend 
Schelling at Jena, and re-entered academic life as Lecturer. 
Ihe two thinkers collaborated 6n' an important essay on 
•The Difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian 
Systems of Philosophy* (1801), as well as in the writing 
and editing of the Critical Joiurnal of Philosophy. 
In the next four years Hegel became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the Philosophical premises as well as the 
formless romantic method of Schelling, along with his 
vague belief in an 'Absolute Identity*, Hegel also came 
to be rather critical of Schelling's position regarding 
4. Ibid., p. 30. 
aesthetics as the supreme mode of access to the Absolute. During 
this period^Hegel became less williag ^ hold that the crowning 
insights of philosophy could be arrived at by 'intuition* or 
•feeling*. He had begun to assert with increasing emphasis 
a 
that they must emerge throxigV^ational and necessary process, 
to which he gave the name of 'Dialectic'.^ 
At Jena, Hegel*s new views and attitudes were 
expressed in his first major published work, Phenomenologie 
des Geistes (Ihe Phenomenology of Mind, 1807),It Is be3rond 
doubt, one of the most brilliant and original worKs of Hegel. 
Ihis work though completed in 1806, was not published until 
1807, after Hegel left Jena to become editor of a daily 
paper at Bamberg in Bavaria. In 1808, Hegel was appointed 
rector of Gymnasium at Nuremberg, where he spent eight 
years (1808-1816). During this time he wrote his second great 
work. Pie Science of Logic, which was published in 1817. 
Ihen Hegel returned to the University and held 
the Chair of Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg from 
1816 to 1818. In 1818, he was appointed Professor at the 
5. Ibid., p. 31. 
University of Berlin up to his death in 1831. In 1816, was 
published his Encyclopedia of the fhilosophjcal Sciences/ 
which carries out the scheme^propounded in 1801, of a 
tripartite system containing a Logic, a Philosophy of Nattire 
g 
and a Philosophy of Spirit. 
Ihe year 1820, saw the publication of his Outlines 
of the Philosophy of Right, which is an elaboration of the 
second part of the Philosophy of Spirit, containing his ethics 
and also his theory of the state. His most inspired reflections 
however, are fovind in the leetxares given by him on the 
Riilosophy of Religion, the Kiilosophy of History, the 
Philosophy of Fine Art and the History of Philosophy. These 
were published after the death of Hegel in 1831 by a group 
of his friends. Ihe chief of the writings unpublished during 
Hegel's lifetime are the essay, 'Life of Jesus' (1795), 
•Ihe Positivity of the Christian Religion* (1796), and 'Spirit 
of Christianity and Its Destiny* (1799). 
Hegel died on 14th November,1831 due to a swift 
attack of Cholera, then epidemic in Berlin. On his request, 
he was btiried beside Fichte and close to the grave of his 
friend^Solger. 
6. Ibid., p. 32, 
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(b) Hegel's Philosophy in brief; 
The best approach to Hegel's Philosophy would be 
to try to understand his relationship to his predecessors 
such as Fichte and Schelling. We can safely assert that 
Hegel starts his philosophy on €tie foundations laid by Fichte 
and Schelling. He agrees with Schilling in insisting on a 
logical method. He^undertakesto put the world-view of 
Schelling on a rational scientific basis. Similarly with 
Fichte, he agrees in identifying logic with ontology or 
metaphysics, and finally with both in conceiving reality 
as a living aeveloping process, which constitutes a system 
of reason with its own laws. Hegel's whole philosophy is an 
endeavor to unfold and explicate these laws. This is what 
he means by his assertion that Ihouight and Reality are 
identical. For him, all being and reason are identical; 
the same process that is at work in reason, is present every. 
where. Ihe Absolute,on the other hand,is not an undiffer-
entiated Absolute, as advocated by Schelling. Hegel in 
criticism of Schelling, characterizes his Absolute as 
'the night in which all cows seem to be black'. Hegel also 
criticises ;$pinoza because he had regarded the Absolute as 
substance. Hegel says,the Absolute is a subject, which means 
well as 
that it is life, process, evolution, as/consciousness and 
knowledge. All life, all motion and action, are but an 
unconscious thinking and follow the law of thought. Hence, 
the more law there is in nature, the more rational is its 
activity. And, finally, the goal toward which the develop-
ing Absolute moves is self-consciousness. Ihe meaning of 
the entire process lies in its highest development which 
is the realization of truth and goodness by a mind that 
knows the meaning and purpose of the universe and identifies 
itself with the universal purpose. 
According to Hegel, the problem of philosophy is 
to know liie world of nature and human experience, to study 
and comprehend the reason in things,, not superficially 
and contingently,but to know their eternal essence, harmony 
and law. "Siings have a meaning, the processes in the world 
are rational. Therefore, one may say that reality is at 
bottom rational, a necessary, logical process of thought. 
It can be known only by thought, and the function of 
philosophy is to comprehend the laws or necessary forms by 
which reason operates. Logic and metaphysics are, therefore, 
identical. The world, however, is not static. It is dynamic. 
So is thought or reason. Ihe notion, or the true concept. 
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is an active, moving process. It is a process of evolution. 
In evolution something that is undeveloped, undifferen-
tiated, homogenous and in Hegel*s sense 'abstract', develops, 
differentiates, divides, assumes many different opposing or 
contradictory forms, \intil at last a unified, concrete, 
particularized object, a unity in diversity, is achieved. 
Ihe higher stage in this process of evolution is the reali-
zation of the lower. In Hegel's language, it is the truth 
not 
and/merely the goal or purpose of the lower but, its meaning. 
The world at every stage is both a product and a projection. 
The lower form is negated in the higher, that is, it is not 
what it was; but it is also preserved in the higher. Hegel 
employs the German wor4 'aufgehoben* to denote these ideas; 
and the process is l<nown as the dialectical process, 
This is the meaning of Hegel's contention that 
contradiction is the root of all life and movement, that 
the principle of contradiction rules the world. Everything 
tends to change and to pass over to its opposite. For 
example, the seed has in it the impulse to contradict 
itself and to transcend itself. Without contradiction 
there would be no life, movement, growth or development. 
But contradiction is not everything. Nature does not stop 
11 
at contradiction, but strives to overcome it. Any two entities 
or processes are opposites with respect to each other, but 
not with respect to the unity or whole of which they form the 
parts, 
3he universe, itself^is a process of evolution, in 
which ends or purposes of universal reason are idealized. 
Ihis is an organic and teleological conception. Tne complete 
organism is the realization* of the purpose, form, notion or 
concept of the organism,or as Hegel would put it, the 'truth* 
of the organism, Ihe important thing in the process of 
evolution is not the initial entity but the end product. OJie 
truth lies in the whole, but the whole is realized only in 
the conpleted process of evolution. Therefore, we may say 
that the Absolute is essentially a result, a fulfillment; 
but it must be enphasised that the result of a process as 
such is not the complete whole. The result together with the 
entire process of development is thetrue whole. The central 
thought of Hegel is that only the whole is real. By 'whole* 
is here meant the whole process leading to the final stage. 
The partial fact is only an abstraction, which needs to be 
brought into connection with the whole in order to gain 
12 
va l id i ty as concrete r ea l i t y . In other words* Reality i s 
not any par t icular stage of development, nor even the 
end of development as a finished re su l t . I t i s the process 
of developit.ent i t s e l f in i t s en t i r e ly - the concrete 
universal . 
For example. 
The bud disappears in the blossoming of the flower 
and the flower in turn disappears in the forming of the 
f ru i t . Here one may say that in an ultimate sense, the 
bud i s contradicted by the flower and the flower by 
the frtuit. These different forms are not only d i s t i n -
guished, but they displace each other in a d ia lec t ica l 
sequence which forms an organic uni ty. In th i s 
unity the ' different stages or forms, although 
conflicting, are necessary to each other; and t h i s 
7 
necessity f i r s t const i tutes the l i f e of the whole. 
The function of philosophy i s to show how one 
stage evolves from the other and how i t necessarily 
emerges from the other. 
7, Regert, A Students History of Philosophy, New York., 
P. 461. 
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Dialectical Method; 
Philosophy is a conceptual inethod as Kant had 
declared. But, Hegel maintains that we cannot exhaust reality 
by abstract concepts. Reality is a moving dynamic process, a 
dialectical process, which abstract concepts cannot capttore 
fully, "niey can apprehend only a very small part of the 
total reality. Reality, ftai of constant change as it is, 
full of negations, contradictions and oppositions. For 
example, the plant germinates, blooms, withers and ultimately 
dies. Similarly, man passes from birth through childhood, 
youth, maturity and then old age/and finally death. 
Hegel holds that all existence has truth only in 
the Idea. The idea pervades the whole and all the parts of 
the whole. All particles have their reality in this unity. 
The activity which sees things in their wholeness, or 
unifies the opposites, is a higher function of mind, which, 
however, cannot dispense with the intellect. The two 
functions such as speculative reason and abstract intellect, 
work simultaneously. 
Therefore, thought will proceed from the most 
si»ple, abstract, and relatively empty concepts to the 
14 
more, complex, concrete, and richer ones, the 'notions*. Oiis 
method is known as the dialectical method, which had already 
been discussed by Kant and also employed by Fichte and 
Schelling. Hegel distinguishes three stages in it. We begin 
with an abstract universal concept i.e. thesis; while this 
concept gives rise to a contradiction , i.e. antithesia; and 
finally the contradictory concepts are reconciled in a third 
concept which, therefore, is a union of the other two, i.e. 
Synthesis, For example, Parmenides held that being is permanent, 
HeracLitus believed that it is in constant change, while the 
atomists advocated that it is neither and yet both; that 
everything is permanent and yet changing. The new concepts, 
however, suggests new problems and contradictions, which 
must be resolved in other concepts. And so the dialectical 
process, which seeks to follow the evolution of reality, 
continues until we reach an ultimate notion in which all 
oppositions or contradictions are resolved and preserved. 
But no single concept, not ever the highest, represents the 
the whole truth. A H concepts are only partial truths. Truth 
or knowledge is constituted by the entire system of concepts 
in its development, everyone of which has evolved from a 
basal concept. Truth, like rational reality itself, is a 
living process. 
15 
Iherefcare^  we can say that one thought follows 
necessarily from the otiier. One thought provokes a contra-
dictory thought with which it is united to form another 
thought. Ihe dialectical movement is the logical self-unfolding 
of thought. Hegel expresses thought from its own point of view 
and not as envisaged from outside. Finally, we may say that 
speculative or dialectical thinking is a process that seeks to 
do justice to moving, living, organic existance. It is a 
process in which the differences are reconciled, in which 
the distinctions are not merely made but comprehended too. 
Ihouqht and Being» 
According to the romanticists, being is a flowing 
reality. They were also right in maintaining that being cannot 
be grasped by an abstracting intelligence which catches only 
abstract phases or partial aspects of being. Hegel, however, 
rejects the romanticists* claim that being can be realized 
by mystical feeling^ or aesthetic intuitions. Being is a 
rational process, a process that has meaning. It is not an 
irrational flux, an unorganised and absolutely meaningless 
bliss, but an orderly evolution, a progress. Our attempts 
to split up reality into essence and appearance, inner and 
16 
outer, substance and attributes, force and its expression, 
-t±ie infinite and the finite, mind and matter, God and world, 
gives nothing but false distinctions and arbitrary abstractions, 
Ihe world does not consist of an inner Kernel and an outer 
shell; the essence is the appearance, the inner is the outer, 
the mind is the body, and God is the universe. 
Reality is a process of logical evolution. It is a 
spiritual process^and we can understand it only in so far as 
we experience such a process within ourselves. Tliere is a 
rational necessity in the structure of absolute thought which 
is reproduced in our individual thinking. Thinking evolves or 
develops rationally. It moves logically or dialectically. In 
this sense, it is vmiversal, trans-empirical, transcendental, 
or as Hegel calls it, metaphysical, 
Hegel claims that God or the Idea, meaning the 
potential xaniverse, is the timeless totality of all the 
possibilities of evolution. This Idea in its realized form 
becomes spirit or mind (Geist) . The Idea contains within 
itself, implicitly, ideally^all that unfolds in the actual 
world. The Idea is the creative reason. The study of creative 
17 
reason is logic. Hegel does not mean that God as pure thought 
or logical Idea existed before the creationrof the world. 
According to him,the world was eternally created. Hie being 
of the divine mind consists in self-expression. God is the 
living and moving reason of the world. He reveals Himself in 
the world, in natvire and also in history, which are necessary 
stages in the evolution of God toward self-consciousness. Ihis 
evolution is a logical and not a temporal process. God is not 
absorbed into the world and vice-versa. Because in a significant 
sense, without the world even God is not God, Therefore, He 
cannot be without creating a world and also without knowing 
Himself in his Other. So there must be both unity and opposition 
in the Absolute. The finite world cannot exist without the 
Idea. It is not an independent thing and has no real being 
without God. Therefore, one might say that whatever truth it 
has it owes to God. Just as in our minds thoughts and feelings 
come and pass away without exhausting the mind, so the phenomena 
of nature come and go without exhausting the divine mind. 
Hence, the Idea,apart from its expressions in nature and 
history, exists not only 'in itself'/but considered in relation 
to its manifestations it exists also 'for itself*. Therefore, 
Hegel does not mean that God, or the logical Idea, exists as a 
self-conscious logical process before the creation of the world. 
18 
He cannot be conscious without a world. Ihe characteristic 
Hegelian doctrine that the Absolute becomes self conscious 
only through something other than itself, i.e. the world or 
finite human minds, is known as the doctrine of reflection. 
Logic and Metaphysics; 
For Hegel, logic is the fundamental science, since 
it reproduces the divine thought process as it is in itself. 
In the words of Albert Schwegler, "The logic of Hegel is the 
Scientific exposition and development of the pure notions of 
reason^— of those notions or categories which underlie all 
thought and all being, and which are as well the fundamental 
factors of subjective cognition-, as the indwelling soul of 
objective reality,— of those ideas in which the spiritual 
8 
and the natural have their point of coincidence". 
Hegel says that therealm of logic is truth as it 
is in its own self. It is the exposition of God as he is in 
his eternal essence before the creation of the world or of a 
single finite being. It is thus, no doubt, a realm of shadows, 
but these shadows are the simple ultimate principles, into 
whose Illuminating net the entire universe is built. 
8. Albert Schwegler - Modern fhilosophv. Tr. by J.H. Stirling 
Calcutta, 1982, p. 200, 
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Dialectical thought expresses the inner^ roost essence 
of the universal mind. In such thinking the universal mind 
knows, itself as it is. At this point, thought and being. 
Subject or object, form and content, are identical. The forms 
or categories of thought which logic evolves mirror the forms 
of reality. In the essence of things thought recognises its 
own essence. 
Logic is the Science of pure thought and the other 
Sciences are applications of logic. In logical thinking, pure 
thought may be said to study itself, since thinker and thought 
are one; and in Hie process, the thinker evolves with his 
thinking. Hence, the philosophy of nature studies the Absolute, 
or universal reason. While the philosophy of mind shows how 
reason, after subjugating objective nature, returns to itself 
and thereby achieves self-consciousness. 
In all instances of the revelation of reason, whether 
in nature or in mind, reason appears in an infinite variety of 
teaiporal and transitory forms. It is tihe business of philosophy 
to understand the reason in things, the essense or substance 
of nature and mind, the eternal harmony and order, the immanent 
law and essence of natxire, the eternal element shining through 
the temporal and accidental, the inner impulse shaping external 
20 
forms. Moreover, this reason in things can be known only 
conceptually^through dialectical or logical thought, and the 
only knowledge worthy of the name is a priori or philosophical 
knowledge. The two fields of metaphysics or 'applied logic* 
are Philosophy of nature and Philosophy of mind. 
Philosophy of Naturet 
According to Albert Schwegler, "Nature is the idea 
in the form of hetereity — the notion that has issued from 
its logical abstraction into real particularization, and that 
so, consequently, has become external to its own self, The 
unity of the notion, then has become concealed in nature; and^ 
in assuming for problem the following up of intelJifcjence as 
concealed in nature, or the self-development of natiare into 
spirit. Philosophy must not forget that self externalization, 
sunderedness, out-of-itself-ness, constitutes the character 
of nature as such. Nature is a Bacchantic God, uncontrolled 
9 
by, and unconscious of, himself". 
Logic deals with concepts. In the necessary evolution 
of our thinking It shows how one concept springs from another. 
9. Ibid,, p. 209. 
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The system of concepts which we think in logic, forms an 
organic \^ole and represents the true essence of things. Logic 
is not a merely subjective process occuring in the human mind. 
It is rather a relational structure exemplified in the world 
process, in nature and in mind (in the individual mind) as well 
as the social mind, in the history of the world and in human 
institutions as well. In logic we envisage reason in its purity 
and in its nakedness. Hegel states ttiat logic has no actual 
being, but becomes actualized ohly in the thinking processes 
of man. So , we are not concerned, in logic, with nature, 
history, or society, but with a system of truths, a world of 
ideas, as it is in itself. 
We cannot truly say that the logical Idea passes over 
into nature. Ohe logical Idea is itself nature or to express 
it differently, nature is a form of the logical idea. It is 
the Idea in spatialized and temporalized form, Albert Schwegler 
says, 'Its beginning, middle, and end are prescribed for the 
philosophy of nature. Its beginning is the first or immediate 
characteristic of nature the abstract Universalityofits self-
externality^— Space and Matter. Its end is the disimprisonment 
of spirit from nature, in the form of rational, conscious 
individuality — Man'.^° 
10. Ibid., p. 210. 
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It is the logical concept in its externality. Hegel 
calls it purified or unconscious intelligence. Nature is a 
stage of transition through which the logical idea passes in 
its evolution into mind or spirit. The Idea, which embodies 
itself or is externalized in nature, returns into itself and 
becomes mind or spirit. In mind the Idea reveals itself to 
itself. 
Philosophy of Mind; 
Mind or Spirit passes through dialectical stages 
of evolution, revealing itself as subjective mind, objective 
mind and finally Absolute Mind, Subjective mind expresses 
itself as soul (mind dependent on nature), consciousness 
(mind opposes to natiire), and spirit (mind reconciled with 
nature in knowledge). Corresponding to these stages, Hegel 
has the Sciences of anthropology, phenomenology^and psychology. 
The Idea, or universal reason, becomes soul in the animal 
organism. It embodies itself^creates a body for itself, 
becomes a particular, individual soul, the function and 
vocation of which is to exercise its particular individuality. 
It is an unconscious production. According to Weber, "Man is 
essentially mind, i,e,, consciousness and freedom. But on 
emerging from the hands of nature he is so only in principle. 
The mind, like nature, is subject to the law of development. 
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Consciousness and freedom do not exist at the dawn of individual 
orgeneric life; they are the products of the evolution called 
history". ^ ^ 
Hegel dealt with the soul as a natxiral entity in the 
physical world. Itxe soul as a sensitive, feeling being, and the 
soul as a being that can express itself and act upon the world 
through its body. The upright body, the hand, as the absolute 
tool*/ the mouth/ and the power of weeping and laughing all 
enables man to express in nature to externalize his thoughts 
and feelings. Hegel discussed the next moment of subjective 
mind under the heading of the 'Phenomenology of mind'. 
The third tria(3 of subjective mind, called 'Psychology', 
basically contains descriptions of mental functions such as 
recollection, imagination, memory and thought etc.^ as well as 
descriptions of the practical drives, impulses, and strivings 
towards satisfaction. 
Weber says, "The objective mind first manifests 
itself in the form of right, which is freedom conceded 
11. History of Philosophy - Alfred Weber, Tr. by Frank 
Thilly with fhilosophv Since 1860, by Ralph Barton 
Parry, Delhi, 1987, p. 420. 
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and guaranteed to all. The individual who is recognised 
as free is a person, Ihe personality realizes and asserts 
itself tiirough property. Each legal persons has, by virtue 
of his free activity, the right to possess, and consequently, 
also the right to transfer his property. This transference 
takes place in the form of a contract. The contract is the 
12 
state of embryo". 
Hegel, at the very end of his discussion of subjective 
mind, writes that the freedom which is the culmination of 
subjective mind is only a concept, a principle of mind and 
heart destined to develop into the objective phase, into legal, 
moral, religious, and scientific actuality. The triad that 
makes up the objective mind comprises law, subjective morality, 
and social morality. The first part covers legal rights and 
duties and is exemplified in property, contract and punishment. 
The second is concerned largely with the morality of intention 
and conscience. Finally, the third part is itself a triad. 
Hie first stageof social morality is the family, 'the natural 
or immediate phase*, of objective mind. When members of the 
family have matured, they detach themselves from it and enter 
of 
the world/independent men who compete in an economic arena 
free from tribal allegiances, Hegel calls this phase of social 
life as 'civil society*. 
12, Ibid,, pp. 420-21. 
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Absolute Mind8 
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The t r i ad which completes the Hegelian system i s 
con^osed of a r t , revealed re l ig ion , and philosophy. According 
to Albert Schwegler, *' S p i r i t i s absolute, so far as i t has 
retiarned from the sphere of ob jec t iv i ty i n to i t s e l f , i n to 
the i d e a l i t y of cognition, in to the perception of the absolute 
idea as the t ru th of a l l being. Ttxe subjugation of na tura l 
sub jec t iv i ty by means of e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l observance i s 
the path by which s p i r i t ascends to t h i s pure freedom,to the 
13 Knowledge of i t s idea l substance as the absolute" . 
At the end of the Ehenomenology, Hegel proceeds 
from the r e l ig ion of nature to the r e l ig ion of a r t and then 
to the philosophical knowledge of the h i s to ry of the world, 
Ihe Supreme stage in the evolution of the logical Idea i s 
the Absolute Mind, whose sole pxirpose and work cons i s t in 
making manifest to i t s e l f i t s own nature, and which i s , 
therefore, free and unlimited s p i r i t , iSvery pa r t i cu l a r 
subject as a t r u ly knowing subject i s such an absolute 
subjec t , Ihe Absolute Mind s imi la r ly passes through three 
stages expressing i t s e l f in a r t , r e l ig ion , and philosophy. 
The f i r s t stage of the absolute s p i r i t i s Art, the immediate 
13. Albert Schwegler - Modern Philosophy , pp. 219-20, 
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view of the idea in objective actuality; the second. Religion, 
the certainty of the idea as vAiat is above all immediate 
reality, as tiie absolute power of being, predominant over all 
that is individual and finite, cnie third and final stage of 
absolute mind is Riilosophy which is the unity of the first 
two, is the Knowing of the idea as the absolute which is pure 
thought. Ihe Absolute Mind expresses its essence of trutlj in 
the form of intuition in art, in the form of presentation or 
imagination in religion^and in the form of conception or the 
pure logical concept in Philosophy, B^e mind perceiving its 
inner essence in perfect freedom is art, the mind imaging it 
reverently in religion, and the mind conceiving and knowing 
it in thought is philosophy. Further, one may say that 
philosophy too has no other object than God and is, therefore, 
essentially rational theology as well as an enduring worship 
of God in the service of truth. Finally, each of the three 
forms realizes itself in the dialectical process of evolution 
and has its own history, i.e., the history of art, the history 
of religion, and the history of philosophy. 
In the history of philosophy every great system 
has its necessary place and represents a necessary stage of 
logical development. Each system provokes an opposing one; 
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the contradiction is reconciled in a higher synthesis, which, 
in turn, gives rise to new conflicts, and the dialectic contihues 
until it reaches its culmination in Hegel himself. Ihe Hegelian 
Philosophy represents its final synthesis in which the Absolute 
Mind becomes conscious of itself. It recognises the content 
of its being in the historical development through which it has 
passed. 
C H A P T E R - I I 
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PREJUDICES REGARDING HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY 
(a) React ion t o Hegel ian Philosophy by the N e o - P o s i t l v i s t s e t c , 
Hegelian fh i losophy genera ted extrejue r e a c t i o n s i n 
c e r t a i n q u a r t e r s and gave r i s e to r e a c t i o n a r y movements, the most 
extreme of which r e j e c t e d a l l metaphysics a s a u s e l e s s under tak ing , 
The new German movement's every phase was sub jec ted t o a t t a c k , 
such as i t s Pantheism, i t s i dea l i sm , i t s r a t i o n a l i s m , and i t s 
a p r i o r i methods. Some t h i n k e r s i n s i s t e d on more e x a c t s c i e n t i f i c 
methods, and by t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n reached r e s u l t s a t va r i ence 
with the new phi losophy , Realism, p l u r a l i s m and p o s i t i v i s m 
r e p r e s e n t e d the s c i e n t i f i c r e a c t i o n t o i d e a l i s m . Others refused 
to a ccep t the view t h a t the world was r a t i o n a l , Ihey sought 
answers to the w o r l d - r i d d l e i n func t ions of the mind o the r 
than r ea son , The g r e a t e s t opponents of the s o - c a l l e d s p e c u l a t i v e 
Philosophy a re Herber t Spencer, Schopenhauer, E rnes t Mach, 
P o i n c a i r e e t c , 
P o s i t i v i s t s and n e o - p o s i t i v i s t s both s t r o n g l y 
c r i t i c i s e d and r e j e c t e d the Hegelian Phi losophy, The terra 
"Pos i t i v i sm" was used f i r s t by Henr i , Comte de Saln-Simon to 
d e s i g n a t e s c i e n t i f i c method and i t s ex t ens ion to ph i losophy . 
Adopted by Anguste Comte, i t came t o d e s i g n a t e »n i n f l u e n t i a l 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l movement which, i n the second h a l f of the 
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nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, 
was powerful in m6st parts of the western world. 
Ihe central thesis of positivism \ls that Science 
is the paradigm of valid or true knowledge and facts are 
the only possible objects of knowledge. According to positivism, 
the task of philosophy is to find the general principles common 
to all the sciences and to use these principles as guides to 
human conduct and as the basis of social organisation. This 
position naturally in5)lied the view that fhilosophy does not 
possess a method distinct from that of Science. Consequently, 
positivism not only denies the existence of intelligibility 
of forces or entities beyond facts and the laws ascertained 
by Science but is opposed to any kind of metaphysics and any 
procedure of investigation that is not reducible to a variation 
of scientific method. 
Even though the principal philosophical sources of 
positivism are the works of tJie English empiricists and the 
Philosophers of the Enlightenment, the cultural climate that 
nxartured it can be said to be that of the eighteenth century 
1, Ihe Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 6 (New York: The 
Macmillan Co. 1967), p, 414. 
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i n d u s t r i a l revolution and the optimism generated by the f i r s t 
successes of i n d u s t r i a l techno logy* posi t iv ism c r y s t a l l i z e d 
t h i s climate in to a philosophical programme. However, unlike 
contemporary posi t ivism i t exalted Science without concerning 
i t s e l f with the conditions and the l imi ts of the v a l i d i t y of 
Science,and claimed tha t not only e th i c s and p o l i t i c s but a lso 
r e l i g ion should be amen-able to s c i e n t i f i c wethod. 
Roughly, there are two kinds of posi t ivism, i . e . 
Social posit ivism, with a professedly p r a c t i c o p o l i t i c a l character^ 
and flvolutionary posi t ivism, with a professedly theored^ical 
charac te r , A.uguste Comte and John S tuar t Mill are the p r inc ipa l 
representa t ives of Social posi t ivism, while Herbert Spencer 
represents Evolutionary pos i t iv ism. Biere i s th i rd , c r i t i c a l 
type of positivism, also known as empiriocri t icism, which i s 
d i s t i n c t from both Social and JSvolutionary pos i t iv ism. Contem-
porary forms of posi t ivism i . e . logical posi t ivism and neo-
pos i t iv i sm. can be said to be methodoiajgical offshoots of 
c r i t i c a l posi t ivism which assumed a more rigorous form through 
the work of Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. This movement 
was the immediate h i s t o r i c a l antecedent of the Vienna c i r c l e 
and of neo-positivism in genera l . 
As i s well known, in Hegelianisra, logic i s the 
fundamental Science, since i t reproduces the devine thought -
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process as i t i s in i t s e l f . Dia lec t i ca l thought expresses the 
of thought 
innernvost essence of the universal mind. The forme tar ca t egor i e s / 
which logic evolves are i den t i ca l with the forms of r e a l i t y . 
2 
Ihey hava both logica l and ontological or metaphysical value . 
In s tark con t ras t to t h i s standi the r e s t r i c t i o n of 
necess i ty to the domain of logic, and the consequent reduction 
of na tura l laws to empirical proposi t ions , which are the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the neo-positivism of ea r ly Wittgenstein, 
Carnap and Hans Reichenbach. 
However, i t was Bertrand Russell & G.E. Moore, vAio 
were the two ear ly pioneers of contemporary analysis who, as 
fellow students a t Cambridge University in the 1890s, reacted 
to Neo-Hegelianism which was the dominant philosophic t r ad i t i on 
and 
in England and America a t tha t time,/developed ideas which 
took Br i t i sh philosophy to the extreme of a t o t a l d i s t r u s t 
of a l l speculat ive philosophy. I t m\ast be remembered tha t 
Neo-Hegelian Idealism was speculat ive metaphysics in the 
grand s t y l e . I t attempted to present a complete world-view 
which would describe the natxire of Real i ty , and the ult imate 
r e l a t i on of Man and h is values to Rea l i ty . Idealism, as i t 
f lourished in the l a t e nineteenth century, was the culmination 
2, Frank I h i l l y , A History of Philosophy. (Allahabad: Central 
Publishing House, 1985), p . 484. 
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of centur ies of metaphysical thought which had begun more than 
3 
two thoxisand years ago with the speculat ions of l l ia les . 
Moore, was d i s s a t i s f i e d with Idealism, concentrated 
h i s c r i t i c a l attac)< upon the meanings of the metaphysical 
proposi t ions advanced by the I d e a l i s t s , Two of Moore's most 
valuable tools in t h i s a t tack upon Idealism were h i s refusal 
to deviate from 'common sense* and h is repeated appeal to the 
ordinary meanings of words. Moore attacked one of the most 
basic of the I d e a l i s t ' s p r inc ip le s , i . e . , the doctr ine of the 
I n t e r n a l i t y of Rela t ions . For a number of reasons the major 
I d e a l i s t s had held tha t a l l r e l a t i ons are i n t e rna l , t ha t i s , 
t ha t a thing i s what i t i s because of i t s r e l a t i ons and tha t 
i f i t s r e l a t i ons change, i t becomes a d i f f e ren t th ings . In 
other words, no r e l a t i on i s a mere ' a cc iden t a l ' or external 
r e l a t i on of an ind iv idua l . Moore re jected t h i s doctr ine On 
the simple grounds tha t i t f l i e s in the face of common sense. 
On the other hand, Russell a lso re jected Idealism, 
although for d i f fe ren t reasons. Rus se l l ' s e a r l i e s t writ ings 
were in the areas of logic and mathematics. Together with 
3 . Robert R, Amraerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), pp. 2 -3 . 
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A.N. Whitehead (1861 - 1947) he published the monumental 
PrinciplaMathematical in 1910. Russell himself wrote that 
"... logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and ... 
schools should be characterized rather by their logic than 
by their metaphysics". Ihroughout his career in which he 
uphold different views at different points, Russell did not 
deviate from his joasic attempt to bring to bear the results 
of his logical studies upon the traditional problems of 
metaphysics. 
However, the basis of his rejection of Idealism 
was substantially different from that of Moore. Ohis difference 
is best brought out by citing Russell's reasons for rejecting 
the doctrine of the Internality of Relations. One of Russell's 
main argument was that the doctrine must be false because of 
its consequences for mathematics. He argued that if all relations 
are internal, then the Idealists are quite right in saying 
that ultimate Reality is One and there is only One truth. 
But Russell says that the propositions of mathematics are 
not even partial truths, which is an unacceptable consequence. 
Russell concludes that the doctrine of the Internality of 
Relations is false and the metaphysical views that are deduced 
from it are fundamentally mistaken. 
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According to Russell, the Idealist error is at 
bottom a logical error. Ihey failed to see that not aj.1 
meaningful propositions are of the subject-predicate form. 
An adequate logic must include an independent logic of 
relations as well as a logic of predication. In other words, 
the metaphysical questions such as the nature of relations 
were to be settled primarily in terms of mathematical and 
logical considerations. 
Russell and Moore succeeded in bringing to an end 
the dominance of Idealism in British Philosophy. However, 
despite their rejection of Idealism, neither Moore nor Russell 
seriously doubted neither the pertinence of metaphysical 
problems nor the possibility of solving them through some 
Oi. ouier pnilosopl?ical, logical tools. Both of them continued 
to believe that metaphysical truth is not only possible, but 
each believed himself to have arrived at some fairly plausible 
version of it. Their main dissatisfaction concerned the 
ways used in the past by philosophers to resolve metaphysical 
questions. For them, analysis was primarily a tool to be 
used to sharpen and clarify philosophical problems so that 
they could be solved easily and unambiguously. 
It was Ludwig Wittgenstein, whOjbuilding upon the 
work of Russell and to a lesser extent Moore, was the first 
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t o argue the more extreme thes i s tha t metaphysical questions 
are unanswerable. In h i s book Tractatus Loqico-Philosophicxis 
(1921), Wittgenstein argued the r e a l d i f f i c u l t y with 
metaphysical problems i s not tha t philosopners have fa i led to 
find adequate ways of solving them, but ra ther tha t they are 
not questions a t a l l . Ttiey f a l l to f u l f i l l the minimal 
condit ions of meaningfulness. According to him^all meaningful 
discourse i s empirical in nature, and metaphysics not being 
e n ^ i r i c a l , i s e s s e n t i a l l y meaningless. The proposi t ions of 
mathematics and logic,on the other hand,are necessar i ly true 
because they are tawtologous. But the sentences of metaphysicians 
do not enjoy t h i s s t a tus e i ther since they claim to refer to 
r e a l i t y . 
Wittgenstein held tha t philosophy i s pr imari ly the 
a c t i v i t y of c la r i fy ing the puzzlements or pe rp l ex i t i e s a r i s ing 
from the complexity of language. The task of philosophers i s 
to show the way out of the puzzlement. 
One of the most i n f l u e n t i a l movements in recent 
philosophy whose or igin can be traced back to a reac t ion 
i s 
agains t speculative philosophy/logical pos i t iv ism. I t 
or ig inated in ' the Vienna c i rc le* in the ea r ly twenties and 
had a f f i n i t i e s with the skept ica l empiricism of David Hume 
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and the Sc ien t i f i c Conventionalism of Mach and Poin ca re . 
The logical p o s i t i v i s t s thought of tdieraselves as continuing 
a nineteenth-century Viennese empirical t r ad i t i on , c lose ly 
linked with Br i t i sh enpiricism and culminating in the a n t i -
metaphysical, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y oriented teachings of Ernst Mach, 
Mortiz Schlick (1882-1936)^ was the cen t ra l figure of the school* 
while Rudolf Carnap (1891 - ) , Otto Neurath, Friedrich 
Waismann, Herber Feigl , Jfhilipp Frank, e t c . , were the act ive 
members, with a common a deep dis i l lus ionr t^nt with the s t a t e 
of cont inental philosophy and a d i s t r u s t of a l l the metaphy-
s i c a l approaches prevalent a t tha t time, and a ra ther exaggerated 
respect for the achieven«ntBof science. Ihe cen t ra l core of 
logical posi t ivism i s the ins i s tence on the employuie*it of 
v e r i f i a b i l i t y as the c r i t e r i o n of meaning. "Hie v e r i f i a b i l i t y 
p r inc ip le in i t s s t rongest form requires tha t a statenrsnt, i f 
i t i s to be meaningful, should admit of ve r i f i ca t ion or 
f a l s i f i c a t i o n by d i r e c t confrontation with experience. Ihe 
logical p o s i t i v i s t s invest igated the formal or a p r i o r i 
aspects of knowledge as well as the empirical or a p o s t e r i o r i 
aspects^and re jec t ing Kant 's claim of the v a l i d i t y of synthet ic 
a p r i o r i knowledge, i n s i s t ed with Leibniz tha t the apr io r i 
i s always ana ly t i c . 
I t was the strong and ra ther polemical contention 
of posi t ivism tha t a l l metaphysical sentences without exception 
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are meaningless. The p o s i t i v i s t s agreed with Wittgenstein 
t ha t metaphysical questions are pseuflo-guestions and therefore 
unanswerable. One of the important pe r sona l i t i e s of posi t ivism, 
Rudolf Carnap, defined metaphysical proposi t ions as those 
proposi t ions, which claim to represent knowledge about some-
thing wiiiCii i a over or beyond a l l experiexice. The p o s i t i v i s t s 
maintained tha t what cannot be experienced, even in p r inc ip le , 
cannot be known or even spoken about in meaningful language. 
A.J. Ayer, the most famous logical p o s i t i v i s t of 
England s ta ted , in h i s book Language, Truth and Logic (1936), 
the conception of posi t ivism with uncompromising c l a r i t y and 
zea l , Ayer had placed grea t emphasis upon a r igorous version 
of "Ttxe p r inc ip le of v e r i f i c a t i o n " . According to t h i s versions 
of the p r inc ip le , a sentence cannot be deemed l i t e r a l l y 
meaningful unless i t s a t i s f i e s ce r t a in specified condi t ions . 
Ayer argued tha t metaphysical sentences fa i led to meet those 
4 
conditions and could therefore be shown to be meaningless. 
As far as Hegel is concerned, he bviilt his 
philosophy on the foundations laid by Fichte and Schelling, 
Both Fichte and Schelling employed the logical method. They 
4, Ibid., p. 8. 
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advocated that mind is the principie of knowledge, and all 
philosophy is ultimateiy a philosophy of mind as well. For 
Hegel, too, natxire and mind or reason, both are one, yet 
he subordinates nature to reason. For Hegel, the identity 
of being and reason is a fundamental philosophical premise. 
He emphasises that the same process that is at work in reason, 
is present everywhere. In the words that have become famous, 
•whatever is real is rational, and whatever is rational is 
real'. 
In contrast to the Hegelian philosophy, the neo-
positivists rejected the logical method as well as the 
concept of reason or mind as used by Hegel. They believed 
that the reason by itself is incapable oi revealing matters 
of fact. 
According to Hegel, it is the business of philosophy 
to know the world of nature and of human experience, to study 
and comprehend the reason in inherent things, not, their 
superficial, transitory and accidental forms, but their 
eternal essence, harmony and law. Things have a meaning and 
the processes in the world are rational. Since reality is 
at bottom a rational, necessary, logical process, it can be 
known only by thought. And since the function of philosophy 
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will be to understand the laws or necessary forms by which 
reason operates, logic and nretaphysics are two aspects of the 
same enterprise. 
Hegel believed that Being is a rational process, a 
process that has meaning and must be thought. It is not an 
irrational flux, an unorganised, absolutely meaningless 
happening, but an orderly evolution, a progress. Reality is 
a process of logical evolution. It is a spiritual process, 
and we can understand it only in so far as we experience such 
a process within ourselves. Ihere is a rational necessity in 
the structure of absolute thought which is reproduced in our 
individual thinking. IhinKing evolves or develops rationally. 
It moves logically or dialectically. In this sense, it is 
universal, trans-empirical, transcendental, or as Hegel called 
5 it metaphysical, 
Hegel calls God the Idea, meaning the potential 
universe, the timeless totality of all the possibilities of 
evolution. Spirit or mind (Geist) is this Idea in its realized 
state. Hegel declares that the world was eternally created, 
Ttie beiriy ot tne divine mind consists of self-expression, God 
is the living and moving reason of the world. He reveals 
5. F. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, p, 482, 
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himself in the world, in nature and h i s to ry , which are 
necessary stages JLa the evolution of God towards Sdlf-
consciousness, Ih i s evolution i s a logica l but not a 
temporal process . God i s not absorbed in to the world nor 
the world in to God, Megel says tha t without the world God 
i s not God. He cannot be without creat ing the world and 
without knowing himself in h i s o ther . Ihere must be both 
uni ty and opposition in the Absolute, 
In con t ras t to Hegelianism, the neo -pos i t i v i s t s 
or logical p o s i t i v i s t s as pointed out above se t aside a l l 
philosophical questions whether of Metaphysics, Ethics or 
Kpistemology as t o t a l l y i r r e l evan t to man's understanding of 
r e a l i t y . According to Carnap, philosophy had to be destroyed 
not renovated. The logical p o s i t i v i s t s thought of themselves 
as extending the range of Science over the whole area of 
systematic t ru th and as needing for tha t purpose to destroy 
the claim of i d e a l i s t philosophers to have a specia l kind 
of supra - sc ien t i f i c access to t r u t h . 
In general , the neo-pos i t i v i s t s explained, when 
they said tha t philosophical a sse r t ions were meaningless. 
6. I b id . , p . 483. 
^1 
they meant only that they lacked "cognitive meaning". Ethical 
and metaphysical Assertions have emotional associations, Ihis 
distinguishes them from mere jumbles of word. 
Finally, as far as Hegel's theory is concerned, we 
can say that his own philosophy does not satisfy his own 
requirements of any system of thought. According to him,his 
philosophy is no less than a synthesis of all philosophies 
and is, therefore, perfect, but this is a notion privately 
held and a notion for which there is hardly any kind of 
justification. 
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(b) Mlsimderstandlnqs regarding Hegel 's way of Philosophy; 
In t h i s chapter we wi l l attertpt a brief and roxanded 
account of Hegel 's Philosophical doctr ine , and t ry to r e l a t e 
i t to the ideas and language of otu: own time, Ih is wil l a lso 
helps 09,to find our way through the tortuous labyrinths of 
Hegel 's philosophy^which have been the despair of many a 
sympathetic commentator, Hegel 's writ ings are a t once so 
unique in the i r language, and so singular in the i r mode of 
argument, tha t i t i s extremely d i f f i c u l t to represent them 
However, 
a t a l l accurately in a brief f a sh ion / Our concern wi l l nei ther 
be with those who have commented on Hegel nor with those who 
have been much influenced by h i s teaching, but with the ac tual 
wri t ings themselves $ind to those philosophers who have 
misconceived Hegel 's way of phi losophis ing. 
Ihere are several reasons why such a general 
restatement and reassessn«nt of Hegel shoflld be attempted. 
I t would be worth doing i f only on accoxint of the vastness 
of Hegel 's influence even on the wave fronts of contemporary 
European thought. I t i s worth while sketching and s iz ing up 
a system which has provoked so huge a l i t e r a t u r e , which has 
been so variously in terpre ted and c r i t i c i z e d , and which has 
given b i r th to so many movements and counter move nents ever 
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since i t was propounded. Even the Anglo~3axon world did not 
remain free from the spe l l of Hegel daring the l a s t half of 
the previous centxary, and the f i r s t quarter of the present 
one. I t produced several highly o r ig ina l thinkers , e .g . , 
Bradley in England and Royce in America, who owed much of 
the i r insp i ra t ion to Hegel,much of the f i r s t quarter of t h i s 
century saw the English speaking world of philosophy busy 
in disowning and abandoning Hegelian posi t ions t ha t had been 
previously held. Now i t i s possible to examine and evaluate 
rtegel with the detached appreciat ion possible in the case of 
other g rea t philosophers, Hegel has a lso an immense, although 
somewhat inverse influence on cont inental thought through the 
react ion he inspired in the 'w i l l fu l ly narrow, pass ionate ly 
perverse, r e l ig ious soul of the mid-century^Dane Kierkegard , 
whose views, despi te the i r appearance ofbeing the very 
a n t i t h e s i s of Hegel 's ideas, are so e s s e n t i a l l y Hegelian in 
basic approach tha t they might have come s t r a i g h t from one 
of Hegel 's own phenomenological s t ud i e s . Further, the 
s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences between Hegel 's system and the 
Indian phi losophical systems have prompted some very 
i l luminat ing work whose significance goes far beyond m«re 
comparative study. 
The complex r e l a t i on of Hegel 's ideas to tne xdeas 
of KarL Marx, and the influence tha t Hegel has exercised 
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through Marxism in various ways is too well known to be 
dwelt upon at length. We are not maintaining that Hegel 
deserves a reassessment and restatement merely on account of 
his influence on later thinkers, Hegel deserves a reassessment 
because, he has been one of those thinkers who inspire extreme 
reactions and is therefore likely to be misinterpreted and 
misunderstood by followers as much as by detractors;and it is 
important to gain a balance of perspective over such a thinker 
in order to appreciate his contribution to civilised thought. 
Here we shall confine ourselves to preparing the way for an 
understanding of Hegel by mentioning thedeep- rooted 
misconceptions, prevailing today. 
First of all, the popular label of Hegel, as a 
transcendent metaphysician, is itself misconceived. A 
transcendent metaphysician is one who deals with objects 
or matters which lie beyond oxir en^ sirical knowledge. But 
in this sense Hegel was certainly not a transcendent 
metaphysician. Further, Hegel is rather vaguely accused 
of being some sort of subjectivist. A subjectivist is one 
who thinks the realm of nature or history exists only in or 
for someone's consciousness, whether this be the consciousness 
of a mind like ours, or of some cosmic or super cosmic mind. 
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This charge again is wide of the mark as far as Hegel is 
concerned. Likewise, the stronger charge that Hegel thought 
that our mind (or the mind of God) made up the world in some 
witting or unwitting fashion also bear close scrutiny. Further, 
the image of Hegel as some sort of manic rationalist, one 
who seeks to deduce or to foresee the detail of natxire and 
experience from the abstract demands of certain notions, who 
tries to do a priori what we now hold can only be done a 
7 
posteriori bears very little resemblence to the real Hegel, 
Lastly, Hegel has been accused of being a thoroughgoing 
political reactionary, who was somehow responsible for the 
brutalities of Hitlerism. A close examination reveals this 
charge to be misdirected as the next. 
As regards the view of Hegel as a transcendent 
metaphysician — one who speaks of matters lying beyond the 
bounds of possible experience, or who welds the data of our 
experience into a whole going for beyond what any mind can 
embrace — the best corrective is to simply glance at the 
contents of Hegel's two systematic works, "The Phenomenology 
of Spirit" and the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences". Both works start with what is 'immediate', and 
as removed from what is ultimate and 'absolute 1—as is 
7. J.N, Findlay, Hegel; A Re-examination, p, 19, 
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phi losophical ly poss ib le . The former s t a r t s with the d i r e c t 
c e r t a i n t i e s of the sense-experience, the l a t t e r with the 
abs t r ac t notion of 'being* — both works likewise end up with 
what i s 'absolute*, the former with the 'iibsolute knowing* 
of philosophy, the l a t t e r v»ith the three forms of 'Absolut© 
s p i r i t ' . Art, Religion and Philosophy. 
A closer examination reveals the fac t tha t according 
to Hegel, the Absolute i s tha t which i s e n t i r e l y present and 
on hand and actual , and not something over and above things 
or behind them. Ihe Hegelian Absolute i s nei ther understood 
in a supermundane consciousness nor in a t imeless comprehen-
sive vis ion, but in the c rea t ive a c t i v i t i e s and products of 
the a r t i s t s , and the fa i th and worship of the r e l i g ious person, 
Hegel does sometimes make use of the transcendent language 
of r e l ig ion , as well as ' the Idea ' , the abs t rac t p r inc ip le of 
consciousness, as ex is t ing l ike God before the crea t ion of 
nature and f i n i t e s p i r i t . But th i s has l i t t l e to do with 
transcendent metaphysics. 
I t i s in the Anglo-Saxon world tha t the maximum 
number of misconceptions about Hegel p r e v a i l . They owe the i r 
or ig in to a confusion between the doctr ines of those who 
8« Ib id . , p . 20. 
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l e a r n t from Hegel (or only half succeeded in leaving frora 
hira)^ and tti*s doctr ine of Hegel himself, for example, " i t 
was Bradley, not Hegel, who believed in some Absolute Experience 
within which the objects of our ordinary human experience 
would be unbelievably fused and transformed, in which ordinary 
categories would be done away with without being replaced by 
anything tha t we can hope to understand, and concerning which 
we ce r t a in ly do not have the 'Absolute knowing*, whereas 
Hegel thinks tha t not only do we have knowledge of the 
Absolute, but in fact , for him i t i s i den t i c a l with the 
Absolute 's own knowledge of i t s e l f . To take another example, 
i t was McTaggart, not Hegel, who made the Absolute i n to a 
t imeless fellowship of s p i r i t s , curiously but not incor r ig ib ly 
deceived in to seeing themselves and the i r own a c t i v i t i e s as 
g 
in time", Ihe un-Hegelian character of these systems i s 
a lso shown by the i r imperfect use of Hegel 's d i a l e c t i c a l 
methods, Ihey make use of contradic t ions to abolish the world 
of appearance and the notions of ordinary l i f e , and then 
pass over to a realm of t ru th and r e a l i t y . However, in Hegel, 
the apparent and fa lse do not dissolve in the solvent of 
d i a l e c t i c , but are re ta ined in h i s f i na l r e s u l t , whose content 
i s no more than the clear understanding of the process which 
has led up to tha t r e s u l t i t s e l f . These systems are likewise 
9, Ib id . , p . 21 . 
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di f fe ren t i a ted from Hegel 's by their doctr ine of an vinlimited 
'coherence'^ of ' i n t e r n a l r e la t ions* between each thing and 
everything e l s e . As opposed to t h i s Hegel accords a proport ionate 
place to iinresolved contingency on the surface of nature, and 
to indeterminacy in the whims of the w i l l ; References to the 
'Universe ' , the 'whole' , are as ra re in Hegel as they are 
rampant in the philosophies of Bradley and McTaggart e t c . 
Therefore, i t i s only fa i r tha t we do not coxmt Hegel among 
them, but condemn or pra ise him for h i s own doct r ines , and 
not for those of o the r s . 
After having dea l t with the'metaphysical charge ' 
against Hegel, now we can proceed to consider the 'Sub jec t iv i s t 
charge*. In the f i r s t place, Hegel i s no i dea l i s t , in the sense 
of holding tha t to be i s to be perceived*, or tha t to be i s 
to be conceived, or tha t objects e x i s t only i f there are 
conscious minds to consider them or to refer to them. Even 
less i s he an i d e a l i s t in the sense of thinking tha t the 
mind imposes i t s forms on the mater ial of sense, or t ha t i t 
' cons t ruc t s ' the world in i t s imagination or thought ' . We 
can a t t r i b u t e such subjectivism to Kant but not to Hegel. 
10. Ib id . , p . 22. 
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In fact , one might go so far as saying tha t from tnx& j^-oint 
of view the main merit of Hegel lay prec ise ly in thoroughly 
s e t t l i n g the ' t ranscendental object* or ' t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ' of 
Kant, the thing as i t e x i s t s apar t from thought or conscious-
ness . For the d u a l i s t i c Kantian idealism, which opposes 
things as they e x i s t for consciousness to things as they 
e x i s t in themselves. Hegel subs t i tu ted an 'object ive idea l i sm' , 
according to which things have no r e a l being except such as 
they have in r e l a t i on to the thinking mind, Ihe "Philosophy 
of Nature" shows further tha t Hegel believed in the existence 
of na tura l objects before the a r r i v a l of l i f e and consciousness 
in the world, Vfliile in the "Philosophy of s p i r i t " he makes i t 
c lear tha t time and space are the forms of externa l things, 
and not only the forms through which the mind views them, Now 
i t i s c lear tha t for Hegel, conscious s p i r i t u a l beings are 
the l a s t beings of the world, and tha t 'Aosolute Spi r i t* , 
as manifest xu tne highest forms of a r t , r e l ig ion and philosophy^ 
i s the l a s t stage to be reached in their experience. 
If we c a l l Hegel an i d e a l i s t we must c a l l him 
one in a thoroughly new sense of word t he employs throughout 
the Ar i s to te l ian notion of teleology or f i na l causation, and 
he holds Mind or S p i r i t to be the f ina l form, the goal or 
11 
• t r u t h ' of a l l our notions and the world, Hegel 's 
11. I b id , , p , 23, 
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thoroughgoing teleology means tha t nothing whatever in the 
world or our thought can have any meaning or function except 
to serve as a condition for the a c t i v i t i e s of self-conscious 
s p i r i t . In d is t inguishing Hegel 's t e leo logica l idealism from 
other forms of subject ive or objective idealism, our aim i s not 
to c r i t i c i s e the l a t t e r , but only to point out tha t the 
elaborate f a l l a c i e s which r e a l i s t c r i t i c i s m udS fotind in such 
forms of idealism must not be a t t r i bu t ed to Hegel, who was 
not an i d e a l i s t in tha t sense. Karl Marx found i t necessary 
to inver t Hegel, in order to transform h i s ' idealism* in to 
Marxist 'materialism*. However, there i s as much materialism 
in Hegel as in Marx^ since matter i s for him surely a stage 
in the ' I d e a ' . 
After having disposed of the ' s u b j e c t i v i s t charge* 
against Hegel, now, we may deal with the view of him as a 
dagnotic apr io r i s t , i . e . , one who sought to deduce the d e t a i l 
of h i s to ry and nature from the r e l a t ionsh ips of abs t rac t 
concepts. 
Hegel believed in a systematic Science (Wissenschaft) 
inwhich a l l concepts could be linl?ed together in a continuous 
chain. But the important point to be noted i s t ha t the ru les 
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of t h i s 'Systematic Science* are far from being deductive in 
the sense in which the ru le s of a syllogism or a mathematical 
calculus are deductive. They are ra ther precepts which vurge 
us to pass from notions in which some pr inc ip le i s l a t en t , to 
other notions in which the same pr inc ip le wi l l become manifest. 
Hegel sometimes 's ides* with one Sc ien t i f ic theory against 
another, as he cons i s ten t ly supportsKepler and Goethe agains t 
Newton. But in t h i s , Hegel 's Philosophical aim i s not to do 
the work of h i s to ry or science, nor to add to the i r r e s u l t s , 
but to frame concepts in terms of which these r e s u l t s can be 
phi losophical ly grasped. Hegel 's geniiine empiricism and freedom 
from a p r i o r i presupposit ion i s , however much more de f in i t e 
than tha t of a philosopher l ike Herbert Spencer, whose "F i r s t 
Pr inc ip le" a t t en^ t s to prove much more r igorously several points 
12 about the physical universe than Hegel. 
If Hegel i s not to be regarded as a r a t i o n a l i s t gone 
made, he i s also not to be regarded as a dishonest reasoner . 
Hegel wri te?, 'For the r e a l i t y in i t s e l f , the general outcome 
of the r e l a t i on of the Understanding to the inner nature of 
things, i s the dis t inguishing of what cannot be dis t inguished, 
or i s the unity of what i s d is t inguished. This uni ty is,however. 
12. I b i d . , pp. 23-4. 
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as we saw/ j u s t as much the r e c o i l from i t s e l f , and t h i s 
conception breaks as under i a t o the opposition of se l f -consc i -
ousness and l i f e ; the former i s the uni ty for Which the 
absolute xanity of difference e x i s t s , the l a t t e r , however, i s 
only t h i s unity i t s e l f , so t ha t the unity i s a t the same time 
13 for i t s e l f . Here i t i s of covirse hard to maintain tha t 
Hegel 's use of language i s in every way defensible . However, 
i t i s less indefensible than i s usual ly supposed. Hegel, 
explores notions from a pecul iar angle, to see them as 
embodying half-formed tendencies, sometimes conf l ic t ing , 
which other notions wil l bring out i n t o the open; and to 
explore such r e l a t i o n s among notions ce r t a in ly requires the 
employment of a new vocabulary. For example, i f we wish to 
say that the notion of it^chanism involves a covert mutual 
f i t t i ngness among in te rac t ing objec ts , which i s brought out 
in a chemical or a te leo logica l r e l a t i on , we are ta lking of 
a r e l a t i on among notions for which no brief expression i s 
appropr ia te . Iherefore, Hegel i s within h i s r i gh t s in resx>rting 
to metaphor. And since the rela+:ions dea l t with are r e l a t i o n s 
of tendency, which would be misdescribed i f given a fa lse 
c l a r i t y of out l ine , Hegel i s j u s t i f i e d in using metaphors 
13, G.W.F. Hegel, Ihe Phenomenology of Mind, t r , by J , B . B a i l l i e , 
(London; George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1955), p , 142. 
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which are de l ibe ra te ly ambiguous with sh i f t ing shades of meaning, 
This i s not to say tha t such a procedure excuses a l l Hegel 's 
14 o b s c u r i t i e s . 
As regards the contradic tory elements in Hegel 's 
language^ i t must be remembered tha t the t e s t of se l f - con t ra -
d ic t ion does not l i e in the mere combination of an expression 
with i t s verbal negative—to say ' i t i s and i t i s n ' t ' n e e d not 
be non-sense a t a l l . I t l i e s so le ly in the use to which such 
a combination i s put, i . e . i f a man r e a l l y wants to take back 
what he has j u s t put forward, so as to leave nothing s tanding. 
Religious discourse has in a l l ages said important things in 
super f i c i a l ly contradictory language. Moreover, contradic t ions 
must a r i s e in developing tendencies l a t e n t in ordinary speech, 
or in combining various forms of d iscourse . To recognise such 
contradic t ions i s in a sense to have gone beyond them, or to 
have la id the foundation for new accommodations. 
I t i s debatable whether i t i s re levant , in discussing 
the views of a philosophical th inkers , to enter in to the 
•progressive* or ' r eac t ionary ' character of h i s p o l i t i c a l 
because the supposedly 
opinions. B u t / r e a c t i o n a r y ' character of Hegel 's views has 
14. J.N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, p . 25. 
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a 
encouraged/conspiracy of neglect against h i s philosophy, the 
issue needs to be discussed, Hegel used to be regarded as a 
toreYxBT of 'Prussianism*, and i s now thoxaglit by some to have 
been a forebe^ar ij± National iiocialism. I t may be said tha t 
Hegel 's p o l i t i c a l view are much more balanced and many-sided 
and he e x p l i c i t l y maintained tha t an unbounded respec t for 
persons, oveiTriding a l l r a c i a l , credal and other differences, 
should be the foundation of the s t a t e , a bel ief of which 
15 H i t l e r ' s Fascism represents the d i r e c t negation. 
Final ly, we may say that Hegel i s worth reassessing 
and r e s t a t i ng on account of the grea t contemporary relevance 
of many aspects of h is thought, A grea t philosopher has a 
side to show to every age. If the German Romantic period 
valued him for one s e t of v i r tues , and the Victorian and 
Edwardian ages for another, our present period may also 
find something congenial and useful in h i s doc t r ine . Oiar 
ideas of time, of knowledge, of matter, of being, e t c . are 
a l l poised, as i t were, in unstable equilibrium, and the 
f r ag i l e push given by unusual exampleswill suffice to s e t 
them r o l l i n g . That our ideas and verbal usages ^i.e ' d i a l e c t i c a l ' 
15, I b id , , p , 26, 
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in this manner is certainly something of which contemporary 
thought is aware» Hegel tso shares with contemporary thought, 
the view that it is our tendency to develop thought and 
language in one sided ways, to exaggerate and to fix tendencies 
implicit in current usage, which gives rise to philosophical 
puzzles and contradictions. While the modern thought attributes 
this freezing, exaggerating action to the misunderstanding by 
philosophers of the fluid forms of our language, Hegel assigns 
it to the 'understanding', the faculty of 'hard-and-fast' 
abstract thought, which he opposes to 'Reason', the more 
fluid and accommodating thought-faculty. Wittgenstein says* 
'Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our 
understanding through the instruments of our speech*. Hegel 
says in remarlcably similar language: 'The battle of Reason 
consists in this, to overcome the rigidity which the Under-
17 
standing has brought in. Both thinkers believed in a 
'transfigured ordinariness' of thought and speech into which 
philosophical exaggerations will have to retreat. For 
Wittgenstein Philosophical exaggerations disappear in this final 
ordinariness, and need not, except for a confusion, have 
16. Ibid., p. 27. 
17. Wi t tgens te in , Ph i lo soph ica l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s . I , 109; 
Hegel, L, Logic , p . 107^ (W,, p . 67) , c i t e d from 
Hegel : A Re-examination, by J .N , Findlay , p . 27 , 
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emerged a t a l l , while for Hegel the i r emergence i s e s s e n t i a l 
to tiie f ina l r e s u l t , and i s in some sense 'preserved ' in i t . 
Hegel i s a lso close to contemporary thought in the g rea t 
s t r e s s which he lays on the xinity of thought and language, as 
well as in tiie s t r e s s tha t he lays on the profound 'Wisdom* 
or in t e l l igence inherent in ordinary usage, which sometimes 
prevents us from u t t e r ing some piece of philosophical non-
sense to which we should otherwise feel inc l ined . 
One may conclude by saying tha t despi te the many 
and fortfeful react ion against h i s system of thought Hegel 
continues to occupy a s ign i f i can t place among the g r e a t e s t 
thinkers of the world, and a study of h i s thought i s c e r t a in ly 
not unrewarding. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
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APPROACH TO OHS HEGALIAN SYSTEM 
(a) Kant's Philosophy as a point of Departure; 
Kant (1724-1804) began his philosophical career as 
a rationalist of the Wolffian School, but he soon saw its 
inadequacy. According to it, we can begin with innate ideas, 
but how can we say that they are also true of the external 
world? After rejecting rationalism, he began to look upon 
experience to explain knowledge. However, he was roused from 
his dogmatic slumber by the Sceptical writings of Hume, At 
last he was dissatisfied with both rationalism and empiricism. 
By his criticism of empiricism and rationalism, Kant demonst-
rated that both are one sided and true only in a limited sense 
and that we can explain the process of knowledge by a synthesis 
of the two. In the words of H,E, Cushman, "To Kant both 
empiricism and rationalism were dogmatic, the one because it 
assumed the validity of sensation, the other because it 
assumed the existence of innate ideas", Ihese two major 
themes persisted in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant siimmarized, 
in his own words, as the "StsBcry Heavens abovie and moral law 
within".^ 
1. H.E, Cushman, A Beginners History of Philosophy, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., Boston (1920), p, 24. 
2, A History of Bhilosophical System ed. by Vergilins Perm, 
Chap. 22, p. 2B0, 
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Kant 's problem was "to l imi t Hume's skepticism on 
the one hand, and the old dogmatism on taie other, and to refute 
and destroy materialism, fatal ism, atheism, as well as s e n t i -
3 
mentalism and supe r s t i t i on" . 
Iherefore, h i s problem was to find out the condit ions 
which would make knowledge poss ib l e . According to Kant, genuine 
knowledge i s universal and necessary knowledge. He agrees with 
the r a t i o n a l i s t s tha t there i s such knowledge in mathematics 
and physics . A speculat ive or r a t i o n a l metaphysics i s impossible, 
He a lso agrees with the en^j i r ic is ts tha t we can know only what 
we can experience, tha t sensation provides the matter of oxir 
knowledge. He agrees with the r a t i o n a l i s t s tha t universal and 
necessary t ru th cannot be derived from experience. Kant says 
t ha t the senses furnish the mater ia ls of our knowledge, and 
the mind arranges them in ways made necessary by i t s own 
na ture . Hence, we have universal and necessary knowledge of 
the order of ideas, thoiagh not of things-in-themselves. Tt\e 
contents of our knowledge are derived from experience, but 
the mind thinks i t s experiences, conceives them according t o 
i t s nat ive a p r i o r i , t ha t i s , r a t i o n a l . Kant agrees with t h i s 
conclusion of Hume tha t we cannot know the things-in-themselves 
3 . F . I h i l l y , ^ History of aii losoohv, p . 413. 
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because they are beyond our experience. We can think them, 
but not know them as we know the facts of the empirical world. 
Ihus according to Kant our knowledge is confined to phenomena. 
Like Berkeley and Hume, Kant believes the world to be phenomenal. 
This phenomenal world is the object of our knowledge. So the 
basic question for Kant is the problem of knowledge. He was 
in search of the nature and origin of knowledge. What is 
knowledge? How is it possible? What are the boundaries of 
human reason? In order to answer these questions, we must 
examine human reason. Knowledge always appears in the form 
of judgen^nts in which something is affirmed or denied. But 
we can not say that every judgment is knowledge, Ihere are 
two kinds of judgements viz. analytic and synthetic judgements. 
In an analytic judgement the predicate term is already contained 
in the subject term, e.g. Body isan extended thing. However, 
if it is to become a knowledge, a judgment must be syntnetic. 
In a synthetic judgement, we must add something to the predicate, 
extend our knowledge, not merely elucidate it. For exair^ jle, 
A.11 bodies have specific gravity. But it is not necessary that 
all synthetic judgeaents give us genuine knowledge. There are 
some which are derived from experience. Therefore, we may say 
4. Ibid., p. 414. 
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that such judgements are lacking in necessity. Reason does 
not con5>el their acceptance, as it compels the acceptance of 
a mathematical proposition. Again, we may also say that they 
are lacking in universality. Judgements lacking in universality 
and necessity, or a posteriori judgements, are not scientific. 
To be knowledge, a synthetic judgement must be necessary, ana 
it must be universal too. Universality and necessity have 
their source not in sensation or perception, but in reason 
or in the understanding itself. We know without experience 
or we may say prior to it that the sum of the angles of a 
triangle must be equal to two right angles that it will always 
be so. 
According to rationalism, there is a universal 
faculty of reason by virtue of which each individual has 
certain innate ideas. Knowledge proper, according to it, 
is exclusively constituted of such ideas. Ihis theory explains 
xiniversality and necessity as Kant says. All men have the 
same innate ideas because of their possessing a common faculty 
of reason. Therefore, being constituted of them cognitive 
propositions must be the same for all men. Again, all persons 
cannot but perceives the truth as theirrativnal faculty directs 
them. Hence^cognitive propositions constituted by innate ideas 
5. Ibid., p. 415. 
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must be necessary as a r e s u l t of inner compulsion. 
But as far as ra t ional ism i s concerned, i t l i e s in 
another d i r e c t i o n . Innate ideas are subject ive, being in the 
mind of human knowers. Here the question a r i ses tha t what i s 
the guarantee t ha t they wi l l a l so be t rue of facts? Here 
Descartes and Leibnitz have given the i r views. According to 
Descartes, God's t ru th i s the ult imate guarantee for the 
factual t ru th of c lear and d i s t i n c t i deas . I t i s qui te evident 
tha t c lear and d i s t i n c t ideas by themselves do not eicplain 
the i r fac tual guarantee. Ih is i s evident with regard to 
Descar tes ' escplanation of our knowledge of the externa l world. 
But i f c learness and d i s t i nc tnes s of ideas by themselves cannot 
explain factual proposi t ions, then the magic terra 'God* cannot 
do th i s miracle . Similar ly l ike Descartes, Leibnitz too believes 
tha t a l l ideas are inna te . Therefore, he has to answer the 
question concerning thei r f a c t u a l i t y . Here he takes recourse 
to the doctr ine of pre-es tabl ished Harmony. According to 
Leibnitz, God has so created the monads tha t the order and 
development in one i s re f lec ted in those of a l l other monads. 
Therefore, the doctr ine of pre-es tabl i shed harmony i s an 
6. Y, Masih, A C r i t i c a l History of Modern Philosophy (Delhi; 
Motilal Banarsidas, 1983), p . 195. 
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a priori assumption, which cannot explain actual states of 
affairs. So that the doctrine of pre-established harmony 
remains an unverifiable as well as fictional explanation ot 
proper knowledge. According to Y, Masih, "OJiere is yet 
another difficulty of rationalism. Rationalism starts from 
certain clear and distinct conceptsand proceeds to other ideas 
systematically and gradually as a result of deductions from 
them. TJius, Descartes started with a definition of substance 
as that which is in itself and conceived through itself with-
out dependending On anything else for its existence, Of cotir^ e^  
Descartes in-consistently enough had accepted the reality of 
mind and body as two relative substances. Spinoza tried to 
correct this inconsistency of Descartes. Spinoza through his 
rigorous logic concluded that there could be only one substance, 
other things of our daily experience, including the thinker 
himself, according to Spinoza, are mere modes 'which never 
are'. Leibnitz saw this inconsistency of Spinoza. He therefore 
began with the pltorality of monads. His difficulty lay in nor 
7 
reaching any unity in plxirality." 
Thus, rationality has given rise to the two contrasted 
systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz. Both of them have the same 
7, Ibid., p. 196. 
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starting point, namely, a self-evident-definition of substance 
as appeared to them. Yet their conclusions taken singly are 
highly unsatisfactory, and, taken together are mutually 
contradictory, Therefore, the chief crux of the review is that 
reason, unaided by experience, can build castle in the air only. 
Iherefore, Kant rejected rationalism on the ground that it 
dealt with airy structures without corres|)ondence with facts. 
The problem before Kant was to show how and why we 
can have genuine knowledge. To answer these questions, we must 
examine the organ of knowledge, '^e must consider its powers, 
its functions, its possibilities, and its limitations as well. 
According to Kant, rationalism and enpiricism both had failed 
to explain knowledge because both of them were based on a 
common assxamption concerning the status of objects. According 
to both of them, things as objects of knowledge exist external 
to the mind. Knowledge presupposes a mind. We cannot think 
without having something to think about, and we can have no 
object of thought unless it is given through the senses, 
unless the mind is receptive or has sensibility. Sensibility 
furnishes us with the sense qualities which are constituents 
of perceptual objects. Tliese perceptual objects must also be 
thought, understood, or conceived by the vinderstanding. Whenever 
6^  
we perceive any object we perceive i t in a pa r t i cu l a r space 
and time. In tiie absence of t h i s space-time, nothing can be 
perceived. Therefore, v« must say tha t the two forms of 
space and time are present in every percept ion. Actually 
these are not the forms of a c t i v i t y and therefore i t must be 
admitted tha t mind has a facul ty by which these forms are 
col lec ted by percept ions . I t should be remembered here t ha t 
l ike Hume, Kant also admits t ha t space and time are not 
subject to experience. We do not have the sensation of space 
and time. But the difference i s t ha t Hume absolutely denies 
the existence of space and time because they are not perceived, 
while Kant considers them due to mind's faculty of s e n s i b i l i t y . 
According to t h i s view, the mind i s act ive in the process of 
knowledge. 
Whenever we think about an object we accept the 
p r inc ip le of causa l i ty about i t . Ih i s cause-effect p r inc ip le 
i s a natural p r inc ip le while thinking about ob jec t s . According 
to Kant, the l imi t s and failxjxes of empiricism point out the 
level af ter which enpiricism cannot explain knowledge and 
do not show the l imit of knowledge i t s e l f . Now i f i t i s admitted 
with Hume tha t the law of causa l i ty i s not supported by sense-
experience, i t only means tha t the sense experience i s unable 
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to explain the principle of cause and effect. It does not 
disprove its existence. If we fail to find the basis of 
causality in senses we must try to search it in mind. In 
mind, there are some universal necessary characteristics of 
experience which are found in all mental experience, Kant 
calls them as categories. Among the twelve categories, these 
are the important/ i.e. quantity, quality, relation, 
modality. According to Kant, no thinking about any object is 
possible in the absence of these categories of knowledge. 
Now because these categories do not come from outside^ So 
it can be said that material of knowledge comes from outside 
and the mind gives form or shape to it. 
The concept of the understanding play an indispensible 
/Knowledge 
role in knowledge.'would be impossible without the co-operation 
of sensation and perception on the one hand, and thinking and 
understanding on the other. These two preconditions of 
knowledge are fundamentally different, but supplement each 
other. Therefore, we might say that percepts and concepts both 
constitute the elements of all our knowledge. Because percepts 
without concepts are blind. While concepts without percepts 
are empty or foolish. All that the intellect can do is to 
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elaborate what is given by sensibility. Thus, Kant, remarks* 
"Since the ndnd prescribes its law to nature, it follows thiit 
we can know a priori the universal forms of Nature",^ Although 
all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow 
10 that it arises from experience". Ifeen the question arises. 
How is knowledge possible? Further, the question is divided 
into two: How is sense perception possible? and. How is 
understanding possible? The first question is answered in 
Transcendental Aesthetic (doctrine of the faculty of perception), 
while the second in the Transcendental Analytic (doctrine of 
concepts and judgements), 
The Critical, Transcendental and Agnostic: Philosophy of Kant; 
The formulation of the transcendental method by 
Kant is perhaps the first attempt in modern philosophy to 
invent a distinctively philosophical method. Bacon, Hobbes, 
Descartes andLeibintz before him were enthusiastic methodo-
logists. Bacon recommended to Philosophy the inductive method 
of the natural sciences. While Hobbes and Descartes both 
advocated the mathematical method, and Leibnitz philosophy 
8, F. Ihilly, A History of Philosophy, p. 416. 
9. Ibid., p, 425. 
10. T.H. Green, Kant; Selections (New York: Charles Senvners 
Sons, 1929), pp. 26-7. 
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employs a combined inductive mathematical method. Since Kant i t 
has become the fashion among philosophers to invent new ph i lo -
sophical methods which sha l l be appropriate to the peculiar 
subject-matter of philosophy. For example, the a n t i t h e t i c a l 
method of Pichte, the i n s t i t u t i o n a l method of Schell ing and 
Bergson and the d i a l e c t i c a l method of Hegel, Kant 's claim to 
have invented a new technique of phi losophical inquiry i s 
usually impl ic i t ra ther than explici t^ but there can be no 
doubt about Kant 's pre tent ions in the matter . In a charac ter -
i s t i c passage, he makes i t c lear t ha t the method of the 
transcendental philosophy i s a "peculiar" method and not the 
mere revamping of the prevai l ing methods of the Sciences. 
In fact , Kant did not r e j e c t empiricism and 
ra t ional ism ou t r igh t . His s ta ten»nt was tha t both enpiricisra 
and ra t ional ism are r i g h t in what they affirm, but wrong in 
what they deny, Empiricism affirms tha t knowledge i s cons t i tu ted 
by experience, and^rationalism affirms tha t knowledge i s 
cons t i tu ted by innate or a p r i o r i i dea s . Enpiricism i s r i g h t 
i n as rauch as i t points out tha t proposi t ions of fac ts can 
be derived from experience. But ra t ional ism i s a lso r i g h t in 
as much as i t points out tha t knowledge i s cons t i tu ted of 
a p r i o r i elements a l s o . Again, empiricism i s wrong in as 
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much as i t denies the presense of a p r i o r i elements involved 
in knowledge. In the same way, ra t ional ism wrongiy denies tha t 
sense-experience a lso cons t i tu t e s knowledge, Ttie proper 
view as Kant s ta ted tha t knowledge begins with experience, 
but does not necessar i ly o r ig ina te from i t . As soon as 
sense-experience r e g i s t e r s i t s impressions on the mind, the 
mind a t once i s s t i r r e d i n to i t s own a c t i v i t y and contr ibutes 
i t s own ordering a c t i v i t y in to d i s c r e t e impressions. The 
ordering a c t i v i t y i s discharged by a p r i o r i elements. Knwoledge 
proper i s a j o i n t venture of sense and xinderstanding. Apart 
from sense and understanding there i s reason which useless ly 
t r i e s to cons t i tu te knowledge. However, the ideas of reason 
are not cons t i tu t ive but regula t ive p r inc ip les of knowledge, 
iherefore, according to Kant, knowledge begins with sense, 
proceeds thence to understanding and ends in the reason. 
The argument from experience to i t s necessary 
presupposit ions i s the crux of the transcendental method, 
and a t t h i s point Kant 's procedure diverges widely from 
tha t of t r a d i t i o n a l empi r i c i s t s , Empiricism proceeds 
induct ively from exper ien t ia l facts to hypotheses and 
genera l iza t ions grounded in those f ac t s ; whereas Kant 
argues demonstrably from the facts to the necessary conditions 
of the i r p o s s i b i l i t y . The e i tp i r i c i s t appeals to the f ac tua l i t y 
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of experience, Kant to i t s e s s e n t i a l na ture ; the empir ic i s t 
1 1 
reiisons indtictively, Kaht demonstrably. Kant maintains, 
"I e n t i t l e transcendental a l l knowledge which i s occupied 
not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge 
of objects in so far as t h i s mode of knowledge i s to b e 
possible a p r i o r i " . Biere are three modes in which the mind 
proceeds for ordering any enp i r i ca l knowledge. In the f i r s t 
ins tance, d i s c r e t e sensations have to be organised i n to space 
and time to give r i s e to percep ts , Ihese percepts have to be 
organised further by the twelve categories of understanding. 
Percepts and concepts joined together yield en^jirical 
knowledge. A further process of synthesis i s effected a p r i o r i 
by the three ideas of reason, namely, the world, soul and God. 
However, these ideas are regula t ive only and concerning them 
no knowledge i s poss ib le , Ih i s conclusion of Kant concerning 
supersensible and metaphysical e n t i t i e s i s known as Agnosticism. 
Agnostic philosophy holds tha t humaa j-eings have 
no faculty for knowing cer ta in ult imate r e a l i t i e s . We know 
tha t they are, but we do not know what they a r e . Kant maintains 
tha t there are things-in-themselves w^ich are unknown and 
unknowable. Ih is doctr ine of the unknowable follows from h i s 
11. F. Ohilly, A History of Philosophy, p . 417. 
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transcendental philosophy. According to the transcendental 
philosophy of Kant only those objects are known which lend 
themselves to hvunan forms of knowing. Naturally objects of 
knowledge would be transfigured and transformed by these 
a priori forms of hxoman knowing. Therefore, Kant maintains 
that we can know objects only as they appear to us, coloured 
ans transformed by our ways of knowing. What these objects 
are in themselves can never be ascertained by us. Hence, 
according to Kant, knowledge of the phenomena alone is 
possible. While noumena or the things-in-themselves remain 
12 
unknown and unknowable. 
The major works of Kant comprise three critiques 
of Pure Reason,Practical Reason and Judgement. Therefore, 
his philosophy is known as criticism, as opposed to dogmatism. 
According to Kant, both empiricism and rationalism were 
dogmatic systems. Kant says that dogmatism is an uncritical 
procedure in Philosophy without previous criticism of 
human powers of knowing itself. He maintains that empiricists 
dogmatically maintained that experience exclusively constitued 
knowledge, and in the end fell into the scepticism of Hume, 
Similarly, the rationalists,with equal dogmatism held that 
12. Y, Masih, A Critical History of Modern Chilosophv, pp, 199-200, 
71 
innate ideas alone const i tu ted knowledge. The dogmatist 
s e t no ^.iiait to knowledge, and the scept ic s e t no l imi t to 
ignorance. Ihus, the one sided and exaggerated claims of 
dogmatic philosophers earned nothing but r idicule , . '« 
According to Kant, a c r i t i q u e of pure reason i s 
concerned with the faculty of reason in general , in respect 
of a l l knowledge after which i t may s t r i v e independently of 
a l l experience. Iherefore, we may say tha t Kant 's enquiry i s 
transcendental in which he seeks to lay base the ap r io r i 
elements which the mind brings to bear upon knowing any 
objec ts whatsoever. A c r i t i c a l philosophy, in the sense of 
Kant, goes beyooji any dogmatic systems in so far as i t i s an 
attempt to reach pr inc ip les , which are pr ior not only to a 
13 pa r t i cu la r controversy but to a l l controversy. The enqiuriy 
Oi. ixdiit xs dlnost exclusively concenea with a p r i o r i c o n t r i -
butions of mind. The subject of the present enquiry i s the 
question, how much we can hope to achieve by reason, when 
a l l the mater ials and ass is tance of experience are taken 
away. 
13. Caired, E. ' C r i t i c a l fliilosophv of Kant' , vol , I , pp. 7-8. 
14. N.K. Smith, 'Immanual Kant 's Cri t ique of Pure Reason", p . 8, 
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Ihus/ we can say that for Kant metaphysics is not 
Science, but it deals with values. Metaphysical entities, 
according to Kant, are not objects of Scientific enquriy, but 
of faith. Faith for Kant lacks evidence sufficient for cognitive 
certainty, but is sufficient for action. Faith therefore is 
belief even in the face of contrary evidence which leads to 
devoted acts for the realization of values. Thus, for Kant 
metaphysics leads to all pervasive orientation to life. 
Secondly, Metaphysics is prompted by a natural disposition 
in Man. Hence, Kant would opt for metaphysics a priori. 
Therefore, in a very large measure, Kant leads to idealistic 
metaphysics. By calling his philosophy critical and transcen-
dental, Kant has shown the primacy of mind in constituting 
knowledge proper, Kant in various ways wants to show that 
the nature of the human mind is the main factor in any 
knowledge whatsoever. No matter whichever be the object 
of knowledge, it has to be moulded, transformed and coloxjred 
by the organ of knowledge, i.e. the human mind. But the 
most central statement of Kant is, 'understanding maketh 
nature out of the materials it does not make.' Thus, it 
directly paved the way for Idealism which greatly 
formulated by Hegel after Kant. 
73 
(b) iTaeallsm In H e g e l ' s Predecessors and i t s i n f l u e n c e 
on Hegel: 
I dea l i sm i s a metaphys ica l d o c t r i n e which teaches 
the supremacy of the s p i r i t over m a t t e r . The most impor t an t 
kind of i d e a l i s m i s known as Absolute I d e a l i s m , And abso lu t e 
i d e a l i s m ho lds t h a t mat te r i s n o t mind, bu t mind remains 
founda t iona l t o mat te r and i s the key t o the unders tanding of 
m a t t e r . 
PRE-HEGELIAN PHILOSOPHY; 
A p h i l o s o p h i c a l epoch i s recognized by the 
common t a s k s the t h i n k e r s of t h a t epoch s e t themselves as the 
p r i n c i p l e bus ines s of ph i losophy . Hence i t i s u se fu l to 
enqu i re what the p r e - H e g e l i a n ' s i n t e r e s t s were, Bie contempo-
r a r i e s and immediate p redeces so r s of Hegel was focussed on 
the fol lowing t a s k s : 
( i) How t o b r ing u n i t y i n t o the system of knowledge or to 
f ind a common b a s i s for the p r i n c i p l e s of n a t u r a l Sc ience , 
the p r i n c i p l e s of moral judgement, of Aes the t i c form and 
the p r i n c i p l e s of the purpos ive dimension of the u n i v e r s e , 
( i i ) What to do with the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f ? A concept t h a t 
was a byproduct of a s o l u t i o n but had become a problem i n him 
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( i i i ) How to j u s t i f y the ideas of God, freedom and immortality. 
I t now seemed des i rab le to comprehend in the ijinity of a system 
the various tendencies of the age: c r i t i c a l idealism, 
Spinozism/ ra t ional ism, the fa i th philosophy as well as the 
notion of development which occupied a prominent place in 
15 French thought in the writ ings of Herder, 
Kant opposed mechanism, fatalism, atheism, egoism, 
and hedonism as wel l . He made room for a r a t i o n a l f a i th in 
human values by l imit ing the discurs ive understanding to the 
f ie ld of phenomena. Law ru les in the world of sense experience 
and the subject matter of na tura l Sciences, i . e . every event 
(human actions as well) i s a link in the causal chain. In 
'Cri t ique of Pure Reason' Kant confined the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
knowledge to the phenomenal domain and declared the thing-
i n - i t s e l f to be beyond the pale of knowable. However, a 
close reading of the other c r i t i q u e s conveys the impression 
tha t the notion of the t h i n g s - i n - i t s e l f i s del ineated 
progressively as we advance in our knowledge of the c r i t i c a l 
system concerned a t f i r s t , i t i s but the shadow of an abs t rac -
t ion, but l a t e r becomes a necessary idea of reason, a 
15. F. I h i l l y , A History of Philosophy, p .451. 
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regula t ive p r inc ip le expressing the r a t i ona l demand for 
unity by means of the ideas of the soul, world and God, 
for 
Further, /Kant the idea of freedom i s the possible ground of 
a l l th ings . The moral law expresses i t s r e a l i t y and vouch-
safes the existence of God, a s p i r i t u a l kingdom, and immor-
t a l i t y , Ihe implicat ion of t h i s i s t h a t the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f 
which began as an abs t rac t ion acquires a conceptual out l ine 
16 and i s in terpre ted as freedom, p r a c t i c a l reason, and w i l l . 
By v i r tue of an imp l i c i t correspondence between the self 
and the world,the moral law within us i s shown to provide 
ce r t i t ude of the existence of the supersensible world, which 
i s beyond the reach of physico-roatheroatical methods of 
understanding. Whether Kant could have gone fur ther , as some 
c r i t i c s have argued, and developed the speculat ive p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
suggested by the ca tegor ica l imperative and attempted to 
transcend the l imi ts of experience i s too debatable an 
issue to be tackled here . However, i t can be maintained in 
favour of Kant tha t he could nothave attempted t h i s task 
through the theore t i ca l reason, and he found no p o s s i b i l i t y 
of doing i t while r e s t r i c t i n g himself to immediate experience. 
In a well-known dictum, Kant declared tha t closer we come 
to immediacy, the nearer we are to chaos and the far ther 
16, I b id , , p , 451. 
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trom t ru th ; percepts without concepts are b l ind . He also 
refused to admit the p o s s i b i l i t y of an ' i n t e l l e c t u a l 
in tv i i t ion ' which could enable us to meet the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f 
face to face. And mystical i n t u i t i o n was ruled out because 
Kant was never prepared to en te r t a in mysticism within the 
domains of h i s e s s en t i a l l y r a t i o n a l i s t domain. However, i t 
must be noted tha t despi te h i s ra t ional ism, an element of 
f a i th i s present in Kant 's method, p a r t i c u l a r l y in the context 
of the moral imperative. "We know because we believe in the 
moral law". I t i s moral t ru th tha t s e t s us t r ee and proves 
our freedom. I t was t h i s phase of the new philosophy tha t 
had a t t r ac ted the new generation a^ s i t offered an escape 
from the causal universe without sacr i f ic ing the legi t imate 
claims of knowledge. Spinozism had become popular in Germany 
during the l a t t e r period of the 18th century and was regarded 
by many thinkers , even by those who rejected i t , as the most 
cons i s ten t dogmatic system. Lessing, Herder, and Goethe were 
influenced by i t . Fichte accepted i t s r ig id determinism as 
inev i t ab le , before h i s acquaintance with Kant. In f ac t i t 
was the Kantian solution to the controversy between 
feeling and i n t e l l e c t combined with the i d e a l i s t i c world-
view which formed the s t a r t i n g point of post-Kantian or 
pre-Hegelian Idealism with i t s own recognizable charac ter -
i s t i c f ea tu res . 
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Hegel's predecessors made treedom ( i n t e l l i g i b l e 
world) the s t a r t i ng point of the i r thought. Ihey regarded 
the ideal or supersensible world or the world of mind or 
s p i r i t as the r ea l world. With such a s p i r i t u a l p r inc ip le 
they t r i ed to solve a l l the problems of philosophy, knowledge, 
expecience, nature, h i s to ry and even i ssues involving human 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . I h i s s p i r i t u a l p r inc ip le , was supposed to 
bring unity i n to knowledge, i n t eg ra t e the ca tegor ies and 
unify theore t i ca l and p r ac t i c a l reason. I t was also burdened 
with the addi t ional task of enabling one to overcome the 
^Aa51TsSn?iS'TOeett wechanism""arR?™LeitfDl0gyy"^^*"^^QJ-" ^^ 
argviment ran somewhat l ike t h i s : r e a l i t y can be understood 
only when i t i s in te rp re tea in the l i g h t of self-determining 
reason, and reason understands the world only when i t 
understands i t s e l f . I t follows tha t the discovery of 
appropriate epistemological solut ions wi l l solve the problems 
of metaphysics. 
However, epistemological solut ions in t h i s context 
meant something quite d i f fe ren t since, a new meaning was 
given to the notion of knowleage. I t was agreea t ha t a 
method which l imi t s i t s e l f to phenomena in a spat ia l - teraporal-
causal se r i e s can not ofter knowledge. To know means to 
comprehend the ac t ive , l iving, synthet ic s p i r i t u a l pjjoee^s 
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of r e a l i t y . They also agreea in the i r conception of r e a l i t y 
as a process ot evolution, in the organic cind h i s t o r i c a l 
view of th ings . However, t h i s happening consensus so ra re in 
philosophy, ended here , Ihe methods of reaching the knowledge 
of t h i s r e a l i t y were envisaged.di f ferent ly by each of them. 
JOHN GOTTUEB FICHTE (A.D. 1762-1814) ; 
Fichte may be regarded as the founder of German 
Idealism. He began as a Kantian, but subsequently he attempted 
to make Kant 's philosoohv more s e l f - cons i s t en t . But what 
exact ly happened to Kant 's thought in the process i s a 
d i f f i c u l t question to answer. I t has apt ly been said that , 
"Fichte i s a Kantian in about the same sense tha t Plato 
17 was a Socra t ic" , He pointed out weaknesses of Kant 's 
philosophy. Alongwith Reinhold he maintained the necess i ty 
of deducing the categories from one single p r inc ip l e s 
which i s the highest conceivable. I h i s c r i t i c i s m was quite 
val id since Kant did not make i t c lear as to how the 
d i f fe ren t categories flowed from the uni ty of apperception. 
Secondly, Fichte also agreed with Maimon who had demonstrated 
how the common view of the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f was incons i s ten t 
17. Falckenberg, History of Modern £hilosophy, t r . Armstrong, 
(New York,Henry Hott . & Co. 1893), p . 419. 
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with the Kantian pos i t ion . However, Fichte, was not content 
to only remove the defects of Kant 's thought# and propose 
ce r ta in amendments, but propounded a new system in h i s 
"WISSEN3C-HAP.TSLEHRE" (Theory of Sc ience ) . . , "in which he 
believed the t ru th of Kant 's philosophy shone in i t s pur i ty 
without the inconsequent excrescences which Kant allowed to 
18 
remain on i t " , as claimed by Radhakrishnan, 
Fichte thought tha t the forms of perception, 
categories of understanding, the ca tegor ica l imperative and 
nii« |iirii»Mii>*nnn n€ f-Viia pr^j;;-^;,!^^! reason must be connected in 
a logical manner such tha t they can be unambiguously formu-
la ted . He wished to trace a logical r e l a t ionsh ip between 
these a p r i o r i p r inc ip l e s and to show thei r common der ivat ion 
and inter-dependence, F i ch t e ' s Wissen Schaftslehre contains 
the a p r i o r i p r inc ip les as pre-supposed in every iscience and 
in a l l knowledge of ourselves and na ture . He believed tha t 
universal knowledge of every kind can log ica l ly be derived 
from the pr inc ip les of h i s new Science of Wissenschaftslehre, 
though he was sober enough to admit tha t speci f ic pa r t i cu l a r 
events cannot be so deduced by reason^and wi l l have to be 
observed as they ac tual ly occur. 
18, Radha Krishnan, History of irhilosophv-Sastern and Western, 
vol , I I , (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953),p. 263. 
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In h i s Wissen Chaftslehre Flchte says, tha t In our 
consciousness we have two types of contents^ one tha t are 
within us and e n t i r e l y dependent upon our imagination and 
w i l l . We are free to r e t a in or dismiss them according to our 
choice. While the other are those t h a t appear as external 
objects and are independent of v o l i t i o n . Ihey may be thought of 
as i f they were r e a l l y independent of us, and we can suppose 
tha t they owe thei r or ig in to an external t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f , 
Ih i s Kantian solut ion, which Fichte dubs 'Dogmatism' i s 
\ insatisfactory since we have no evidence of any such thing-
i n - i t s e l f , but po^ l t i t as the ult imate cause of oux 
experience in a dogmatic fashion. Further, such a view denies 
existence of the self and the freedom of the w i l l . 
Therefore, Fichte considers an a l t e rna t i ve thes i s 
in which the ego i s abstracted from the t o t a l contents of 
consciousness and assumed to e x i s t as something independent 
of experience, as an l - i n - i t s e l f , Ih i s may be regarded as 
the ultimate source of a l l the objects of experience. This 
view i s ' I dea l i sm ' . I t pos tu la tes beyond experience and 
regards the I - i n - i t s e l f as free and s p i r i t u a l and the 
seemingly external world of matter as i t s product. 
Fichte thinks tha t both these philosophies, v i z . 
Dogmatism and Idealism cannot be reconci led. One has to 
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make a choice between the two. And since reason cannot decide 
the select ion wi l l be made according to ones i n t e r e s t and 
inc l ina t ion . Which kind of philosophy a person chooses wi l l 
depend ul t imately on what kind of a person he i s ("was man 
fur ein Mensch i s t " ) . In short, philosophy i s a matter of 
temperament. "A philosophical system i s not a l i f e l e s s piece 
of fiarniture tha t one might take or d i s c a r d . . . but i t i s 
19 animated by the soul of the man who has i t " . In t h i s way 
Fichte appeals to the moral Character and se l f - r e spec t of 
h i s readers to lead them to Idealism. 
Fichte outl ines an i d e a l i s t i c logic by which not 
only Kantian forms of perception and the ca tegor ies , but a lso 
the contents of sense-experience, are a l l derived from the 
a c t i v i t i e s of self or ego. 
Fichte emphasized tha t "everything must hang firmly 
in a single r i ng" , iie was in search of a F i r s t p r inc ip le 
which shone by i t s own l i gh t and did not depend on anything 
e l se but on which everything e l se depended. He found t h i s 
f i r s t p r inc ip le in the Kantian unity of apperception or 
19. Werke, vo l . I , p . 434 (wuoted from Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, vo l . I l l , p . 194) , 
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self-consciousness from which he derived the notion of 'ego*. 
According to Fichte, ego i s tiie uni ty under which everything, 
whether in existence or knowledge has to be subsumed. In 
other words, we can say tha t what was merely logical or 
epistemological for Kant, became metaphysical for F ich te . 
He i den t i f i e s knowledge and existence in self-consciousness 
because in case of ego, to know and to e x i s t are not two 
d i f fe ren t th ings . Abstraction i s not possible from ego. Ihe 
pr inc ip le of self-consciousness shines by i t s own l i g h t . I t 
i s known by i n t e l l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n . I t i s invar iably the 
product of a construct ive ac t , 
F i c h t e ' s process of deduction proceeds in the 
following fashion: 
(i) Ihe ego p o s i t s i t s e l f . But merely with the ego there i s 
no scope of consciousness, which always requi res an object , 
and we cannot separate consciousness from the ego. Hence, 
alongwith the thes i s we have the a n t i - t h e s i s . 
( i i ) Ihe ego p o s i t s the non-eqo« Ihe unlimited ego and non-ego 
come in to conf l i c t with each other and give r i s e to contra-
d i c t i on . Ih i s i s resolved through syntehs is . 
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( i i i ) iVie gqo pna i t s I t s e l f as limited by the limited non-eqo> 
In t h i s case we have aeterrained or limited egO/ and non-ego 
oy edch other . Oliey do not come in to c<inflict with each other 
as the unlimited ones do, and thus the contradic t ion i s 
removed. By the notions of t hes i s , a n t i - t h e s i s and synthesis , 
Fichte wnats to show tha t self-consciousness involves both 
subject ' and object., as mutually determined and inseparable 
from each o ther . By t h i s synthesis two proposi t ions come 
in to being, (i) The ego pos i t s i t s e l f as determined by the 
non-ego. This provides the foiondation for theore t i ca l philosophy, 
( i i ) The ego p o s i t s non-ego as determined by the ego. This 
provides the foundation for p r a c t i c a l philosophy. 
Fichte regards the p r a c t i c a l aspect of the self as 
more fundamental than the theo re t i ca l aspect . According to 
him, the self i s able to conquer the non-ego sole ly through 
i t s p rac t i ca l a c t i v i t y . I^ i s i s the main reason why Fichte*s 
philosophy goes under the name of e t h i c a l Idealism. 
As Seth says, "The Supremacy which Kant had accorded 
to the p rac t i ca l reason was- taken, therefore by Fichte in a 
much more l i t e r a l and exclusive sense than i t had borne to 
the elder philosopher. The a c t i v i t y of the ego becomes the 
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s o l e p r i n c i p l e by which the e x i s t e n c e of the i n t e l l i g i b l e was 
to be e x p l a i n e d " , ^ 
P ich te maXes the world fundamentally moral and 
s p i r i t u a l i n n a t u r e and a s s e r t s the a i v i n e o r i g i n and 
immortal d e s t i n y of mankind. In h i s metaphysics the I n f i n i t e 
Ego (God) has p o s i t e d f i n i t e i n d i v i d u a l s and an e x t e r n a l world 
i n oppos i t i on t o them. The e x t e r n a l world e x i s t s only for moral 
p u r p o s e s . . . in order t h a t i n i t i n d i v i d u a l s can f ind oppo r tun i t y 
21 to perform t h e i r d u t i e s and r e a l i z e t h e i r v o c a t i o n s . ' Hence 
F ich te says , "Ihe world i s a t a s k . . . the m a t e r i a l of duty 
made manifes t to the senses**. The e x t e r n a l world a r i s e s i n 
our minds i n order t h a t we may overcome i t , bend, i t our 
w i l l s , and r e a l i z e oiarselves i n i t by performing our d u t y , 
B t h i c a l Idea l i sm of F i ch t e t 
For Kant the primacy of moral law was a mat te r of 
' P o s t u l a t e s ' , which F i ch t e r ep laced by a f f i r m a t i o n . F i c h t e ' s 
a t t i t u d e i s t y p i c a l of the I d e a l i s t i c pe r iod which very 
c o n f i d e n t l y a s s e r t s t h a t reason i s ab le to d i s c l o s e u l t i m a t e 
t r u t h . 
2 0 . A Seth, From Kant to ^eqe l , (London: Williams and 
Norgate, 1882), p . 33 . 
21 . Wright, . H i s t o r y of Modern fh i losophy (New York; Ihe 
MacMillan Co. 1954), p p . 304-5 . 
22 • I b i d . , p . 305. 
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Fich t e ' s en t i r e system i s pervaded by e t h i c a l i deas . 
I t begins with Kant 's ca tegor ica l iniperative and ends w i ^ 
the cosmic moral purpose of God. The moral law implies freedom, 
freedom implies overcoming of obstacles , and t h i s implies a 
sensible world. Hie moral law thus intplies an inde f in i t e ly 
continued existence of s t r i f e , hence irranortality; and i t 
25 implies a universal purpose or a God, Ihe e t h i c a l ptirpose 
r e a l i z e s i t s e l f in the world. Nattire and man are but i n s t r u -
ments in the service of the good. Therefore, the vocation of 
man i s to do h i s duty, to worK consciously and voluntar i ly 
for the r ea l i za t i on of the highest good. His conscience 
commands him to free himself from the slavery of the senses . 
Besides t h i s , each individual comes in to the world with a 
unique 'vocat ion ' , which he alone can perform. He should 
feel h i s r e spons ib i l i t y and respect h i s own moral worth and 
d ign i ty . Tlierefore, i t i s man's duty to know what he i s 
doing, and not to act unless he knows what he i s doing. 2his 
i n p l i e s not merely awareness but freedom and courage of 
convict ion. Men should ac t always from conviction and never 
under the compulsion of external au thor i ty . 
For Fichte, morality does not cons i s t merely in 
the good wi l l - i f i t did, i t would be e n t i r e l y vacuous. 
25 , F. I h i l l y , A History of Hiilosophy, p . 462, 
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The good w i l l must expres s i t s e l f i n concre te a c t s , which 
i n v o l v e s an overcoming of n^ature i nc lud ing man's own inne r 
n a t u r e . Mora l i ty i s a s t r u g g l e and the e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
of n a t u r a l goods, a s wel l as a l l the dimensions of c i v i l i s e d 
l i f e , l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t a l l of them have a p o t e n t i a l p l ace 
i n the p u r s u i t of the cosmic moral pu rpose . 
Besides t h i s , F ich te ma in ta ins t h ^ t the u l t i m a t e d e s t i n y 
of man c o n s i s t s i n reach ing out i n t o e t e rn i t y -beyond a l l e a r t h l y 
t h ings such as p r i v a t e r i g h t s , e t h i c s , p o l i t i c s , the voca t ion 
of the i n d i v i d u a l s and the n a t i o n s . I t i s the union with God i n 
p e r f e c t l ove . A good man can ga in consc iousness of t h i s union 
i n h i s p r e s e n t l i f e . This i s the "way to the b l e s sed l i f e " . 
F i ch te had in f luenced the Romantic movement i n i t i a l l y 
but e v e n t u a l l y h i s emphasis on e t h i c s and the c r u c i a l p l a c e he 
a s s i g n s to the Ego d i s s a t i s f i e d the Romantics. Ihey i n c r e a s i n g l y 
f e l t t h a t Nature and Beauty were more s i g n i f i c a n t than the £go 
and m o r a l i t y . Consequently, a t t e n t i o n had began to be d i v e r t e d 
from F i c h t e to Sche l l i ng and o ther Romantic phi losoj jhers , whom 
Hegel s a s svrperceding. 
FRIEDRICH WILHELM SCHELLING (1775-1854); 
Sche l l ing i s cons idered t o be the ch ie f i n t e r p r e t e r 
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of the romantic movement. "He i s the connecting link between 
Fichte arid Hegel^.'^^ J\ast as Fichte s t a r t ed as a Kantian, 
Schelling s t a r t ed as a Pichtean.But la te r on he c r i t i c i s e d 
Fichte for h i s "extreme subjectivism". F i ch te ' s non-ego was 
equated with the whole realm of nature, which was t o t a l l y 
dependent upon the ego. I t was one of Schel l ing ' s aims to give 
(.viture i t s due p lace . And t h i s aim runs l ike a thread through-
out the several phases of h i s philosophy. 
In the f i r s t period, Schelling was under the influence 
of Fichte . He accepted the notion tha t the ult imate knowledge 
can be only in the Ego and hence t r i ed to deduce the nature 
from the essence of ego. Soon af ter he began posi t ing an 
opposition between mind and matter and regarded the Ego as 
having f i r s t produced matter, which la te r become conscious of 
i t s e l f in the mind. After t h i s he viewed the various forms of 
organic l i f e beneath man as successive stages in which t h i s 
development takes p lace . 
The second period begins when Schelling oecomes more 
independent in thought, i . e . a^ter Fichte l e f t Jena in 1799. 
3^ Wright, His tor g of Modern Hiilosophy, p . 311. 
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In this phase of his philosophy, nature and mind iaecame more 
sharply contrasted. According to Schelling, thejre are two 
different sides to philosophy. All knowledge rests upon the 
agreement of the subject with an object J" the union of Ego or 
intelligence and nature. JSither we may first study nature and 
how mind arises in it, i.e. "Philosophy of natxare", or we may 
take intelligence first and then ask how objects proceeds from 
it, i.e. "transcendental philosophy". 
Schelling in his philosophy of nature, atten^ jts in an 
a priori manner to indicate the successive stages of an ascending 
evolution, without sufficient knowledge of Science to make his 
account plausible and to show that the later and higher species 
have actually descended from the earlier ones. iVhile in his 
"transcendental philosophy of idealism", Jchelling tries to 
bringout the different stages of evolution as the development 
of the observing mind, and in doing so imitates Kant by distin-
guishing between theoretical and practical philosophy and also 
the philosophy of art. He considers ^ rt to be the highest, 
because in the intuition of the artist the Ego beholdsitself 
and thus the teleology becomes revealed to Ego. Unlike in Kant 
and Fichte, God becomes the known object of the immediate 
intellectual intuition of the artist. 
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Schelling passes into his third period about 1802, in 
which he shows the influence of spinoza, maintaining that Mind 
and ma^ t^ er are idefiticul. in the field of Knowledge, truth ts 
the form of matter. Ihese two are absolutely synthesized in 
a higher form. For this, first he adopted a mathematical 
method to deduce the 'Philosophy of Identity* and later sought 
to workout a more immediate method of intellectual intuition 
known as 'construction' by which the absolute is seen to be 
in all, and all in the Absolute; the whole is escpressed in 
every relation and object. But he fails to show how an 
Absolute, i.e., pxire identity can be related to a world of 
diverse persons and things. 
Ihe fourth period of Schelling begins from about 
1804, in whichhii approach becomes more mystical. At -this 
stage Schelling stresses the difference between the Absolute 
and the Universe, Ttie Soul has fallen from the plane of 
intellectuality to that of the senses and must seek reunion 
with God. Ihis is symbolized by the myths of Plato and neo-
Platonists, which he reinterpreted in a Christian framework. 
he 
Schelling's fifth period begins in 1809, when/came 
under the influence of German Christian mystic, Jacob Boehme. 
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He now thinks of God as the "Primal Absolute Identity". God 
differentiates Himself into the world of particular beings and 
then returns to Himself in a higher unity as a result of this 
differentiation. Inthis phase Schelling seems to think of God 
as "Life" subject to suffering and growth. 
Schelling identifies nature with spirit or intelligeic e 
in his "Philosophy of Nature", because the laws and the forms of 
natural beings are all intelligible, "Matxire and mind, being 
and thought, are not, however, as Spinoza held, two parallel 
aspects of the Absolute, but different steps, stages or epochs 
in the evolution of absolute mind. Ihe Absolute unfolds itself, 
it has a history: it is an evolutionary process, the highest 
goal of which is self-consciousness". ' Fichte was of the opinion 
that reason is incapable of imposing rational forms on the 
external and independent reality. Ihe rational forms are forms 
of intelligence, and what bears them should be itself intelligent. 
Therefore, in this way he presents a monistic and dynamic view 
of nature and makes a wide use of the principle of development 
to show how nature passing through various forms and grades 
moves towards its highest form, i.e., self-consciousness in 
which the duality of mind and matter and personality and nature 
25 . F. Ihilly, A History of Riilosophy, p. 467, 
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disappear in to a single i n t e l l i g e n t scheme. Schelling thinks 
tha t self-consciousness as such i s mere form and i t i s l3ie 
r a t i ona l content tha t provides value to i t . S p i r i t r e a l i z e s 
i t s e l f not only in consciousness but in the i n t e l l i g i b l e 
contents as wel l . 
Final ly, 3che l l ing ' s philosophy of i d e n t i t y d i sc loses 
the nature of reason as i t i s in i t s e l f . Here, Schelling means 
by reason the 'absolute reason' which i s conceived as the t o t a l 
indifference of the objec t ive . Radhakrishnan maintains, "Itie 
standpoint of philosophy i s the standpoint of reason and the 
philosophic cognition i s the cogni t ion of things as they are 
. . 2 6 in themselves, i . e . , as they are in reason". Such cognition 
gives us 'reason in i t s s e l f - i d e n t i t y ' . Hence the 'nature of 
reason i s iden t i ty with i t s e l f* . Ihere i s nothing except reason, 
and i t i s xindivided, the law of reason i s the law of i d e n t i t y . 
But absolute i d e n t i t y cannot e x i s t i t s e l f , except by se t t ing up 
i t s e l f as subject and object . However, there i s merely a 
quant i ta t ive difference between subject and object , and not a 
qua l i t a t i ve one, because in subject and object we have the same 
26. Radha Krishnan, History of Philosophy; Eastern and Western, 
p . 268. 
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identity out with the difference of emphasis or 'preponderence*, 
of subjectivity and objectivity.However, when we come to the 
field of difference.,, we seem to have already departed from 
27 
absolute identity and are in the realm of finitude." Schelling 
was of the opinion that nothing individual exists in its own 
right but as a mode of absolute identity. Ihings can be viewed 
only from the point of view of totality, in the perfect 
equilibriiim of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Though Schelling could not formulate a thorough system 
like that of his predecessors yet in some respects he advanced 
beyond Fichte. Hegel appropriated various features in Schelling's 
view of the Absolute and its gradual development in nature, 
history and worked them over into a more coherent systematic 
accoxont which he defended by a better logical method, i.e. 
Dialectic. 
Besides this his earlier thought was undoubtedly an 
essential connecting link between Fichte and Hegel. And some 
of his evolutionary ideas paved the way for Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche and Bergson as well. 
27. Ibid,, p. 268. 
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Fich te ' s and Schel l ing ' s influence on Hegel: 
In the beginning Hegel was under the influence of 
both Fxchte and Schell ing. But very soon s c h e l l i n g ' s concep-
t ion of Real i ty o r Absolute appeared faul ty to Hegel. He 
bui lds h i s philosophy on the foundations l a id by Fichte and 
Schelling, He agrees with the former in i n s i s t i n g on a log ica l 
method. He undertakes to put the world-view of Schelling on a 
ra t iona l Sc ien t i f i c b a s i s . He a lso agrees with the l a t t e r , in 
ident ifying logic with ontology or metaphysics; and f ina l ly 
with both inconceiving r e a l i t y as a l iv ing developing process. 
According to Hegel, nature and mind or i^eason are one as taken 
by Fichte and Schelling; ye t he subordinates nature to 
reason, Hegel maintains t h a t a l l being and reason are 
i d e n t i c a l . The same process t ha t i s a t work in reason, i s 
present everywhere. This i s the sense in which Hegel a s s e r t s 
t h a t whatever i s real i s ra t iona l / and whatever i s ra t ional 
i s r ea l . There i s a logic in nature as well as in h is tory , and 
the xiniverse i s a t bottom a log ica l system. The Absolute i s 
not an undif ferent ia ted whole, as Schelling had taught. In h i s 
c r i t i c i sm of Schell ing, Hegel charac ter izes h i s Absolute as 
the night in which a l l cows are black. Nor i s the Absolute 
a substance - as spir^oza had taught, ra ther i t i s a subject, 
which means tha t i t i s l i f e , process, evolution as well as 
28, 
consciousness and knowledge. At another place Hegel also 
2Q F. Thil ly, A History of Philosophy, p . 478. 
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condemned the Absolute of Schelling as "a shot out of a p i s t o l " , 
Conseqiientlyr he thought tha t 'the Absolute to which our 
understanding could not a r i se through i n t e l l i g i b l e r a t i ona l 
s teps could not be considered sa t i s fac to ry in philosophy. Ohe 
Absolute for Hegel, should be one as well as many and the 
subject as well as object . But in order to understand how these 
opposite c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are synthesised, we must examine h i s 
method of d i a l e c t i c . 
C H A P T E R - I V 
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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
(a) H e g e l ' s view on R e l i g i o n ; 
Re l ig ion occupies a very s i g n i f i c a n t p l a c e in the 
ph i losophy of Hegel . Philosophy as a whole and i n i t s p a r t s 
i s determined by i t s o b j e c t , and R e a l i t y as the a b s o l u t e l y 
i n d i v i d u a l whole i s the supreme o b j e c t of ph i losophy . While 
r e l i g i o n i s not an o b j e c t i n t h i s sense , i t comes wi th in the 
domain of phi losophy by v i r t u e of being an a t t i t u d e towards 
an o b j e c t . And s ince the Absolute i s the suprene o b j e c t for 
Hegel and the o b j e c t of the r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e i s the Absolute 
in i t s un i ty , i t i s no t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t r e l i g i o n should be 
one of the most impor t an t s e c t i o n s i n the Phenomenology. 
Hegel a r r i v e d a t the main i n s i g h t s of h i s system on the b a s i s 
of the C h r i s t i a n f a i t h . I n f a c t , i t would not be a d i s t o r t i o n 
to regard H e g e l ' s whole system as an a t t empt to see the 
C h r i s t i a n mys te r i e s i n e v e r y t h i n g . Whatever, every n a t u r a l 
p r o c e s s , every form of human a c t i v i t y , and every l o g i c a l 
t r a n s i t i o n . 
Hegel says t h a t ' t o begin with, i t i s necessa ry 
t o r e c o l l e c t g e n e r a l l y what o b j e c t we have before us i n the 
Philosophy of Re l ig ion , and what i s our o rd ina ry i d e a of 
r e l i g i o n . We know t h a t i n r e l i g i o n we withdraw oocse lves from 
9( 
what is tea^oral,and tiiat religion is for our consciousness 
that religion in which all the enigmas of the world are solved, 
all the contradictions of deeper-reaching thought have their 
meaning unveiled, and where the voice of the heart's pain is 
silenced. It is the region of eternal truth, of eternal rest, 
of eternal peace. Speaking generally, it is by reason of his 
being spirit, that man is man; and from man as spirit proceed 
all the developments of the "Sciencesand arts, the interest of 
political life, and all those conditions which have reference 
to man's freedom and will. All that has worth and dignity for 
man, all wherein he seeks his happiness, his glory, and his 
pride, finds its ultimate centre in religion, in the thought, 
the consciousness, and the feeling of God. Thus, God is the 
beginning of all things, and the end of all things. As all 
things proceed from this point, so all return back to it 
again. In religion man places himself in relation to this 
centre, in which all other relations concentrate themselves, 
and in doing the same he rises up to the highest level of 
consciousness which is free from relation and is absolutely 
self-sufficient. Religion,as something which is occupied 
1, F. Hegel, Lectufes on the Philosophy of Religion, tr. and 
ed. by the Rev, E.B, Speirs, B.D., and J.B. Sanderson 
(London: Routledge ^ Kegan Paul, 1962), vol, I',, pp. 1-2. 
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with th i s f ina l object and end, i s therefore absolutely free, 
and i s i t s own end. The existence of r e l ig ion i s presupposed 
as forming what i s fundamental in everyone. I t i s not the 
concern of philosophy to produce r e l ig ion in any ind iv idua l . 
So far as man's e s sen t i a l nature i s concerned, nothing new i s 
to be introduced in to him. To t ry to do t h i s would be absurd, 
Hegel begins h i s treatment of the Religious conscious-
ness by noting how often in the previous development we have 
come on phases tha t deserved the name ' r e l i g i o u s ' . There was 
something re l ig ious in the a c t i v i t i e s of the Sc ien t i f i c 
Understanding, when i t located explanatory forces and laws 
beneath the surface of objective exis tence . We were studying 
a mood of Religion when we dea l t with the anguish of the 
Mnhappy Consciousness. In the e t h i c a l sphere, we dea l t with 
a r e l ig ious phase tha t was concerned with mysterious family 
and blood-t ies , with ancestra l a l legiances and the powers of 
the 'uether world*. In the world of the Enlightenment we 
d e a l t with a r e l ig ious phase which placed i t s object safely 
2 
and sseptically beyond all Rational Insight. Ihe self-
conscious spiritual individual then rose to the height of 
2, J,N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination, p, 131, 
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its development: in the consciousness of loving forgiveness, 
which broke down the barriers between persons, it at length 
overcame the 'otherness of the other*. Henceforth, according 
to Hegel, it has siurmounted even consciousness. It can have 
no alien object before it, but only itself. 3^ e consciousness 
in which it first gains possession of this truth is called by 
Hegel 'Religion', which is thereby given a content identical 
with the central theses of his own philosophy. This Religious 
consciousness only differs from the philosophical in that it 
retains what Hegel calls 'a form of representation' 
(Vorstellung). Further, the religious view will have varying 
degrees of development of the 'world', the natxoral and social 
order, 
Hegel may be held to have given a merely persuasive 
definition of 'Religion*. He defines Religion, not as it 
would be defined for instance by sociologists or anthropologists, 
but in a manner to suit the requirements of his system, riis 
main motive seems to be to secure for the difficult theses 
of his philosophy^the approval that normally accompanies the 
words 'Religion' and 'Religious'. It may be claimed that 
Hegel is siaply cashing in on this widespread approval, and 
securing its advantages for his own system. In fact, he did 
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gain much approval in h i s l i fet ime by general ly conveying the 
impression of being a defender of r e l ig ions and p o l i t i c a l 
orthodoxy. Hegel might havestciessed i t s 'form of r epresen ta t ion ' 
ra ther than i t s not ional content, and might have emphasized i t s 
supersession, rather- t i ian i t s preservat ion, in ult imate ph i lo -
sophical t r u th . But from another point of view riegel's account 
of Religion i s by no means indefens ib le . I t can be claimed in 
tha t 
extenuation of riegel's account,/he did not impose h i s phi loso-
phica l theses on the re l ig ion he found about him, but these 
theses were the f r u i t s of some sustained re f l ec t ion on that 
r e l i g i o n . 
In the phases of the Religious consciousness now 
to be gone through, riegel t e l l s us tha t the previous -
phenomenological r e l a t i o n s of s p i r i t to i t s 'world' wi l l a l l 
be resumed. Ihere wi l l be a sensory, a perceptual , a s c i e n t i -
f ical ly-understanding, a customary-ethical, and a moral is t ic 
phase of Religion, Ihese stages wi l l a lso divide themselves 
i n t o : (i) Natural Religion, in which the r e l ig ious conscious-
ness assumes the form of consciousness Proper, of the awareness 
of an object, a thing, in which the self-conscious and the 
s p i r i t u a l are impl i c i t ; ( i i ) The Religion of Art, the product 
of Hellenic S p i r i t , which corresponds to self-consciousness 
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Proper, and finally (lii) Absolute or Revealed Religion, the 
expression of christian civilization, in which the actual form 
3 
of religion is said to be adequate to its 'notion'. 
Now, we can deduce that, for Hegel, although he 
men treat 
admitted that in religion/God as a spirit other than themselves, 
that God is the Absolute and the Absolute is the whole and real. 
Religion is the Divine Spirit Knowing Himself through the 
manifestations of finite spirits. It is the reconciliation of 
man to God, 
RELIGIONS PRIOR TO CHRISTIANITY; 
According to Hegel, the first form of Natural Religion 
is the Religion of Light, of which he holds the ancient 
Zoroastrian religion to have been the historic expression. 
In this the 'self-conscious essence which is all truth, and 
which knows all reality as itself 'becomes aware of itself 
in the mode of aense-certainty» Hegel says that it beholds 
itself in the form of 'being', i.e., of something immediate 
'out there' not as endowed with one or other of the contingent 
qualities of sense, but as manifesting a certain form of 
3. Ibid., p. 133. 
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formlessness ' , which wi l l make i t in to a being f i l l e d with 
the notion of s p i r i t , Ih is 'form of formlessness* the religioias 
consciousness finds ready to hand in the 'pure, a l l -conta in ing , 
and a l l pervading l i gh t of the morning' which may disperse 
i t s e l f over na tura l shapes, but which remains always the same 
•siraple-impaipable, splendid essence*, 
But j u s t as Sense-certainty finds tha t i t cannot keep 
i t s vague object before i t , i . e . , the immediate ' t h i s ' , b^t 
must proceed to turn i t i n to some more def in i t e object of 
perception, therefore, the Religions consciousness too cannot 
r e s t content with an object So formless, but must go on to 
p a r t i c u l a r i z e i t i n t o a var ie ty of vegetable and animal forms. 
We leave the pure radiance of the Iranian dayspring, for the 
pu l lu la t ing mu l t i p l i c i t y of the Indian re l ig ious fancy, which 
often expresses i t s e l f in the murderous, gu i l t y forms of 
warring animal species, each representing some pa r t i cu l a r 
nat ional s p i r i t . 
Ihe warring va r i e ty of t h i s type of religioai? 
expression i s c l ea r l y inadequate to the Religious Consciousness 
4 . G.w.ij". Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, t r . by J . a . Ba i l l i e , 
(London: George Allen 6c Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp.699-700, 
5'. J.N. Find lay, Hegel; A Re-examination, p . 134. 
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Therefore, it 'rubs itself away' into the regular expressions 
characteristic of the Scientific Understanding. Spirit becomes 
an Artificer, revealed to itself in various crystalline, 
pyramidal and needle-like forms. It constructs in an instinctive 
manner like the building habits of bees. Now, we have passed 
over to the religious expressions of ancient Egypt. In these 
the creative unrest of consciousness is present mainly in the 
artificer (craftman), and not in his work, but it tends to 
invade his monumental products, showing itaelf in stylized 
animal forms faintly touched with humanity. The inadequacy 
of such instinctive art to self-consciousness then becomes 
manifest in the form of sphinxes, as Hegel says, ambiguous 
beings, a riddle even to themselves, the conscious fighting 
with the unconscious, the simple interior with the polymorphous 
exterior, coupling obscurity of thought with clearness of 
6 
exp re s s ion ' . ' In the Sphinx th i s s ty l ized , i n s t i n c t i v e , and 
construct ive r e l i g i c a s consciousness may be said to break-
down. 
Now we pass from the Natxore-religions of the ear ly 
East to t he 'Ar t r e l i g i o n ' of Greece. In the Phenomenology the 
two modes of s p i r i t u a l consciousness are not kept apar t , as 
6. F, riegel, Phenomenology, p , 707. 
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they are in the treatment of 'Absolute S p i r i t ' in the 
£ncyclopaedja. Hegel 's treatment of Greek re l ig ion as a 
•Religion of Art* i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of German romanticism, 
so too i s the view tha t while a r t may be an expression of the 
e t h i c a l l i f e of the free city-community, with which the 
individual feels himself a t one, the Religion of a r t a r i s e s 
only when the i nd iv idua l ' s naive t r u s t in h i s secure communal 
ways has been shaken. When s p i r i t has cause only to mourn 
over the loss of i t s secure e t h i c a l background, i t wi l l begin 
to bring forth an 'absolute a r t ' which i s ra ised high above 
r e a l i t y , and according to Hegel, whose forms shadow forth 
' the n igh t in which the Ethical Substance was betrayed, and 
Q 
made in to a s u b j e c t ' . 
The a r t i s t i c r e l ig ious consciousness has i t s f i r s t 
typical expression in the s ta tue of the God, which combines 
the ex t e rna l i t y of nattire with an ideal ized expression of 
self-consciousness . Here the exact and c r y s t a l l i n e forms 
beloved by the understanding are discarded. According to 
Hegel 's view each such matble God stands for the e t h i c a l l i f e 
7. J.N. Pindlay, Hegel; A Re-examination, p . 135, 
8. F.Hegel, Phenomenology, p . 714. 
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of a pa r t i cu la r people because in worshipping i t s God, the 
community i s readily achieving self-consciousness . Hence the 
temples of the Gods are for the use of c i t i z e n s , and thei r 
honovir i s the honour of 'a high-minded people r i ch in i t s 
a r t* . 
The s p i r i t u a l suffering and e f fo r t demand another 
medium for their expression and Hegel finds t h i s in various 
forms of re l ig iot is speech, e .g . , as the hymn and the prophetic 
or ambiguous ut terence e t c . He also finds i t in the combination 
of speech and action which happens in the r e l i g ious c u l t . 
According to Hegel, ' the c u l t i s cons t i tu ted by a two-sided 
movement in which a godlike form, moving in the affect ive 
element of self-consciousness, and the same form a t r e s t in 
the element of thinghood, give up thei r d i s t i n c t des t ina t ions , 
so tha t the unity, which i s the notion of the i r essence, comes 
in to exis tence . In t h i s the self achieves the consciousness of 
the descent of the Divine Essence from i t s transcendent beyond-
ness, while what was previously the unreal and merely objective^ 
achieves thereby, the genuine r e a l i t y of self-consciousness*, 
This two-sided movement we can see in the case of r e l i g ious 
9 . I b id . , p . 720. 
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sac r i f i ce , where the objects sacr i f iced are said to express 
both the worshipper's surrender of h i s own personal i ty , and 
the descent in to a c t u a l i t y and touch with humanity of the God 
to whom the objects are sac r i f i ced . An even more close 
amalgamation (unity) of the divine with human occurs in the 
various r e l ig ious mysteries connected with Deroeter and 
Dionysus. These are mysterious and mystical not in the sense 
of involving hidden secre t s , but in the sense tha t in them, 
' the se l f knows i t s e l f as on© with the Essence. Here the 
Absolute Being achieves the pos i t ion of a thing seen, handled, 
smelt as well as tas ted and i t becomes an object of des i re 
10 
and i s made one with the self in actual enjoyment. However, 
there remains something unseIf-conscious, something largely 
natioral in th i s form of re l ig ious amalgamation. Hegel, says 
' I t s self-conscious l i f e i s therefore merely the raystry of 
the Bread and the wine, of Ceres and Bacchus, not of the 
genuine upper Gods, whose ind iv idua l i ty includes self-
consciousness as an e s sen t i a l element in i t s e l f . S p i r i t has 
not yet offered i t s e l f up to t h i s consciousness as self-
conscious s p i r i t , and the mystry of the Bread and Wine i s 
11 not as yet the mystry of Flesh and Bliod. In other words, 
10. Ib id . , p .728. 
11. I b id , , 728. 
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we may say that we are yet only dealing with a confused 
anticipation of the word made Flesh, and its continuance in 
the life of the religious community. 
Iherefore, at this point Hegel might have made a 
natioral and easy transition to his Absolute or Revealed 
Religion, which was for him manifest in Christianity. Hegel 
maintains that the activities which connected with the major 
athletic festivals are religious activities. For Hegel, 
athletes are lively, living work of art, and matching strength 
with beauty. Ihey represent the 'Essence* in general and also 
the essence of their people. 
Neither Olympic athleticism nor Dionysian enthusiasm 
can be wholly adequate expressions of the union of self-
consciousness with the essence of things. Because in the 
former there is too spiritless a clearness while in the latter 
there is too much confusion and wild stammering. It is in a 
form of speech more coherent than an Oracle's, and less 
emotional and narrow in its direction than that of a hymn. 
Iherefore, Hegel passes on to the consideration of the 
spiritual attitudes lying behind the epic, tragic and comiCL 
or fiinny literature of great age, which Hegel regards as 
religicus phenomena. In the epic the individual self-conscious 
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person i s inadequately enphasized being present merely as the 
anonymous^ background s inger . Ih i s unemphasized individual 
person then claims a more adequate ejqjression in the t rag ic 
form of l i t e r a t u r e , where he speaks d i r e c t l y . While in the 
comic form of l i t e r a t u r e , the individual claims h i s complete 
and absolute due. He s i lences the gnomic wisdom of chorus, 
l iqu ida tes the abs t rac t forms of the Gods and reveal himself 
under a l l high masks and appearances as the everyday, common 
12 place and vulger man as well . 
From the resolut ion of a l l absolutes in the Indiv idual -
i s t i c comic i rony. Hegel now leaps d i a l e c t i c a l l y to the 
individual ized Incarnate World of Ch r i s t i an i t y . 2his extreme 
leap resembles tha t from phrenology to the reasonable self 
in society, or from the death-dealing gu i l l o t i ne to the 
ca tegor ica l Imperative of Kant. Ihe Comic consciousness i s 
summed up in the l ight -hear ted proposi t ion: ' I , the self, 
am the Absolute Essence* but th i s l ight -hear ted utterance 
a t once permits conversion to the ser ious statement: "2ne 
Absolute Essence i s I , the self*, in which self-consciousness 
i s merely an adjunct, a predicate to something more s u b s t a n t i a l . 
Hegel t e l l s tha t t h i s mortal breach between the outward 
and subs tan t ia l , on the one hand, and the inwarei and self -
12. J.N. Findlay, Hegel; A Re-examination, p . 137. 
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conscious, on the other, can be healed only by a two fold 
movement such as by a movement of subs tan t i a l towards the 
aabjec t ive and of the Subject ive towards the s u b s t a n t i a l . Ih i s 
need i s met by a one-sided spread of undisciplined subject ivi ty^ 
over the whole t e r r i t o r y recognised as object ive, as in the 
Gnosticism and the Mystry-rel igions. Ih is passes away when 
th i s one-sided movement of sub jec t iv i ty towards ob jec t iv i ty 
i s met by a balancing movement from the objective towards the 
subjective and when self-consciousness finds i t s e l f in what 
i s independently and immediately the re . Here we find tha t 
Hegel i s pointing to the e s sen t i a l super ior i ty of the word 
made Flesh over the 'Aeons' of Valentinus or, the Unconquered 
Sun of Mithraism. Here the former i s encountered in the 
concrete par t icu lar i ty of sense, whereas the l a t t e r has merely 
13 the shadowy, projected being of p r iva te fantasy. 
Henceforth Hegel says, "Ihis fac t tha t Absolute S p i r i t 
has given i t s e l f the form of self-consciousness both in i t s e l f , 
and also for i t s own consciousness, now appears in as much as 
i t i s the bel ief of the world tha t the S p i r i t i s there as a 
self-cohsciousness, i . e . as an actual human being, t ha t i t i s 
there immediate sense-cer ta inty , tha t the believing consciousness 
sees and fee ls and hears the Godhead, in t h i s manner i t i s no 
13. Ib id . , pp. 138-9. 
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Imagination but an ac tua l i t y in the bel iever . Consciousness 
therefore does not s t a r t from the inner l i f6 of -tiiought, and 
the existence of the God^  ra ther does i t s t a r t from what i s 
14 immediately present and recognizes the God in i t * . 
lb sum up we may say tha t in the above passage what 
Hegel things important i s not the Incarnat io F i l j i Dei, but the 
bel ief in such an incarnat ion. According to him, i f t h i s 
incarnat ion i s said to be actual and not imaginary then i t s 
a c t u a l i t y i s one in the bel iever , ra ther than in. h i s t o r i c a l 
person of "^esus, Ihere i s no doubt tha t the person i . e . Jesus, 
was the vehicle through which 'Absolute Rel ig ion ' , the r e a l i z a -
t ion tha t the divine nature must achieve self-consciousness in 
man, f i r s t became e x p l i c i t . We see tha t for Hegel the r e a l i z a -
tion ra ther than the vehicle remains the important thing. 
Therefore, we may conclude by saying tha t Hegel properly be 
regarded as the father of 'modernism', tha t always attacked 
but never crushed, and trustworthy expression of Chris t ian 
bel ief . 
14. F. Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 757-8. 
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(b) The Concept of 'Absolute Rel ig ion* or 'Revealed R e l i g i o n ' 
(CHRISTIANITY) 
Now we have reached the r e a l i s e d no t ion or concept ion 
of r e l i g i o n , the p e r f e c t r e l i g i o n , according to Hegel, i n which 
i t i s the no t ion i t s e l f t h a t i s i t s own o b j e c t . We def ined 
r e l i g i o n as the s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s of God. Thus God i s s e l f -
consc iousnes s . He knows Himself i n a consc iousness which i s 
d i f f e r e n t from Him, which i s p o t e n t i a l l y the consc iousness 
of God, s ince i t knows i t s i d e n t i t y with God, an i d e n t i t y 
which i s mediated by the nega t ion of f i n i t u d e . I t i s t h i s 
no t ion which c o n s t i t u t e s the c o n t e n t of r e l i g i o n . According 
to Hegel, we de f ine God by saying t h a t He d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
rtimself from nimself , and i s an o b j e c t for nimself ijut ne i s 
p a r t l y i d e n t i c a l with Himself i n t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i s i n 
f a c t S p i r i t . Thus God i s S p i r i t , the s p i r i t of His Chxirch 
i n f a c t , i . e . , of those who worship Him. This i s the p e r f e c t 
r e l i g i o n . Tlierefore, i t i s r evea l ed here t h a t what God i s . 
He i s no longer a Being above and beyond t h i s world, an 
unknown, for He has to ld men what He i s , God knows Himself 
i n the f i n i t e s p i r i t . This sirnply means t h a t God i s r e v e a l e d . 
The misery, the sorrow of the world, was the c o n d i t i o n , 
the p r e p a r a t i o n on the s u b j e c t i v e s i d e for the consc iousness 
of f r ee s p i r i t , as the a b s o l u t e l y f r ee and t h e r e f o r e i n f i n i t e 
15 
. i p i r i t . 
15. F, Hegel, Lectures on the ghilosophy of Religion, vol. II, 
pp. 327-8. 
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Religion i s something revealed only when the notion 
or conception of r e l ig ion i t s e l f ex i s t s for i t s e l f . We may 
also put i t tha t r e l ig ion or the notion of r e l ig ion has become 
object ive to i t s e l f , not in the form of f i n i t e ob jec t iv i ty , 
but ra ther in such a vjay in accordance with i t s notion, tha t 
i t i s objective to i t s e l f . According to Hegel, Absolute 
Religion or what he means by 'Revealed Rel ig ion ' , i s a re l ig ion 
in which the Divine Being i s known for what i t i s , a being 
whose nature i s to be self-conscious^ and also to reveal 
i t s e l f to i t s e l f . In the Ihenomenoloqy of Mind, Hegel comments: 
•Ihere i s something sec re t to consciousness in i t s object , as longas 
t h i s appears strange and a^ien to i t s e l f , and i s not known as 
i t s e l f . This secretness ceases when the Essence becomes 
object ive S p i r i t as S p i r i t . . . I t s e l f i s only manifest to i t s e l f 
in i t s own ce r t a in ty of self, i t s object i s the se l f : Self, 
however, i s nothing foreign, but inseparable uni ty with i t s e l f , 
the immediate xiniversal'/"^ I t i s t h i s immediate un ive r sa l i ty 
which i s the true content of a bel ief in the Incarnat ion. Hegel 
holds uncompromisingly tha t God can be t ru ly reached by the 
Speculative knowledge only. In other words, he holds t h a t 
God's being cons is t s only in speculat ive knowledge. However, 
the content of t h i s knowledge i s held to be one with tha t of 
Revealed Religion. 
16. F. Hegel, Fhenomenology, p . 759. 
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Hegel maintains tha t ^'religion has j u s t t ha t which 
i t i t s e l f i s , the consciousness of liie Essence, for i t s 
objec t ; i t gets an objective form in i t , i t ac tua l ly i s , 
j u s t as, to begin with, i t exis ted as Notion and only as 
the Notion, or j u s t as a t f i r s t i t was our Notion. Ihe 
the 
absolute r e l ig ion i s / revea led r e l ig ion , the r e l ig ion which 
17 has i t s e l f for i t s content, i t s fu lness" . 
According to FindlQy, "The r e l i g ious presenta t ion of 
speculat ive t ru th i s , as we saw, an imaginative, p i c t o r i a l 
presenta t ion; i t has not yet r i sen to the pxore un iversa l i ty 
of conceptual thought. The union of un iversa l i ty with immediacy 
remains for i t tne i r union in the individual self-consciousness 
of Jesus, which excludes the b e l i e v e r ' s own self-consciousness . 
Ihe movement towards a fu l le r universal iza t ion even of such 
u n i v e r s a l i t y - i n - p a r t i c u l a r i t y , begins when the Incarnation 
sh i f t s in to the past , when i t sp r e sen t r e a l i t y becomes a 
18 
matter of memory or t r a d i t i o n " . ^x:cording to riegel, the 
Religious consciousness never completely r i s e s above the 
ex t e rna l i t y of imaginative presenta t ion . When i t seeks for the 
17. F, Hegel, Lee litres on the Philosophy of Religion^ vo l , I I , 
pp. 329-30. 
]B, J.N. Findlay , Hegel; A Re-examination, p , 140. 
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roots of its spiritual life, it tends to go back to the historical 
circumstances of its origin as Hegel says to the 'soulless 
recollection of an ideally constructed individual figure and 
19 
its existence in the past*. ' For Hegel, to seek for the 
historical Jesus is to lose touch with the risen and ascended 
Christ. 
According to Hegel, " I t i s the Christian religion 
which i s the perfect religion, the religion which represents 
the Being of s p i r i t in a realised form, or for i tse l f , the 
religion in which religion has i t s e l f become objective in 
relation to i t se l f . In i t the universal Spir i t and the peculiar 
sp i r i t , the inf ini te Spir i t and the f ini te sp i r i t , are 
inseparably connected; i t i s their absolute identi ty which 
constitutes this religion and i s i t s substance or content. 
Ttie universal Power i s the substance which, since i t i s 
potential ly quite as much subject as substance, now posits 
this potential being which belongs to i t , and in consequence 
distinguishes i t se l f from i tself , comratinicates i t se l f to 
knowledge, to the f ini te sp i r i t ; but in so doing. Just because 
i t i s a moment in i t s own development, i t remains with i tself , 
and in the act of dividing i t se l f up returns undivided to 
i tself".^^ 
19 F. Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 764-5. 
20. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. I I , 
p . 330. 
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As generally understood the object of theology is 
to get to know God as the merely objective God, who is 
absolutely separated from the subjective consciousness, and 
is thus an outward object^ Just as the sky, the suji, etc. 
Just opposite to this the Notion of the absolute religion 
can be so presented as to suggest that what we have got to 
do with is not anything of this external sort, but religion 
itself, i.e. the unity of this idea which we call God with 
the conscious subject. 
Hegel maintains that "we cannot know God as object, 
or get a real knowledge of Him, and the main thing, what we 
are really concerned about, is merely the subjective manner 
2'X 
of knowing Him, and our subjective religious condition". 
Ultimately we find that it is possible from the standpoint 
of consciousness to reach this subjectivity. 
Hegel now gives a phenomenological restatement of 
the doctrines of the Trinity, Creation, and Fall, etc. Hegel 
believes that Spirit conceived abstracity as a '^ubstance' 
in the element of pure thought is the simple, self-identical 
and eternal Essence, Hegel afterwards called the Essence as 
21. Ibid., p. 331. 
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the idea, and which re l ig ion knows as ' the F a t h e r ' . But 
Hegel 
furthej^says tha t t h i s sirrple, and e t e rna l Essence would be 
Sp i r i tua l only in name, i t was conceived only as such an 
abs t rac t Essence, I t must present i t s e l f in so far as the 
r e l i g i o u s imagination transforms t h i s conceptual entailment 
in to an h i s t o r i c a l process, the e t e rna l Essence may be said 
to give b i r th to something other than i t s e l f (God and son 
begotten before a l l vjorlds) . But t h i s procession to otherness 
i s a t the same time and re turn to i t s e l f , since the conscious 
son, and the Father of whom He i s conscious, are the one and 
22 
the same s p i r i t u a l r e a l i t y . therefore, we have the mater ia ls 
for fe Trini ty consis t ing of the Essence, of the self-conscious 
being tha t knows i t , and of the knowledge of the former in the 
l a t t e r . Hegel says, ' the differences tha t are made are as 
immediately dissolved as they are made, and are as immediately 
made as they are dissolved, and the Tcue and Real i s j u s t 
23 t h i s movement turned circlewise on i t s e l f . Therefore, the 
whole Trini ty l ives enshrined in the Cartesian Cogito. However,the 
imagination of the r e l ig ious community cannot r i s e to th i s 
Pitch of abs t rac t ion . 
Ihe same logical entailments which connects the 
elements of self-consciousness, and which i s misleadingly 
22. J.N. Findlav, Hegel; A Re-examination, pp. 140-1, 
23. F. Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 766-7. 
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represented as a temporal process, now leads to the existence 
of a world. Ihe d i s t i nc t i on between the pure Essence of 
Divinity and the self-conscious word i s too abs t r ac t and 
ca tegor ica l to be a r ea l d i s t i n c t i o n . Hegel says tha t i t i s 
a d i s t i nc t i on of love, in which there i s no su f f i c i en t 
opposition of na ture . Iherefore, the e te rna l abs t r ac t S p i r i t 
must c rea te a world, the word ' c r ea t i on ' being merely an 
imaginative symbol for the entailment holding between the 
being of an abs t rac t notion and the being of cases in which 
i t may be i n s t a n t i a t e d . Ihe S p i r i t which i s the sense of the 
world must i t s e l f show an i n i t i a l aspect of separateness and 
24 immediacy* At f i r s t i t must appear as a natt iral individual 
in t h i s world and must regard the world as a system of things 
foreign to i t s e l f . However, being s p i r i t , i t must progress 
from the immediacy of sense-experience to the inwardness of 
pure thought and must in the process lose i t s innocence. On 
the one hand, we may say tha t i t becomes conscious of what 
i s good , i . e . i t s thinking being, and on the other, of what 
i s bad, i . e . , i t s sensuous being. Ih i s epistemological 
progress from sense experience to perception and thought i s 
turned by the r e l ig ious imagination in to the s tory of 
temptation and expulsion from paradise . 
24. J.N. Find lay, Hegel; A Re^exami nation, p . 141. 
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i^he world in which the merely natvaral, self-
re t rea t ing and therefore bad self-consciousness has a place, 
must find a place also for the good self-consciousness, i . e . , 
for S p i r i t returning to self out of sensuousness. Now Hegel 
passes on to a stage where s p i r i t i s conscious of i t s e l f in 
toniversal form, as the S p i r i t insp i r ing a r e l i g ious community. 
The Divine Man who has died i s the communal self-consciousness 
i m p l i c i t : the community must make riis self-consciousness 
exp l ic i t ly i t s own. Ihe death and resur rec t ion of the Redeemer 
must lose the i r simple and na tura l s ignificance as events in 
the l i f e h i s to ry of a pa r t i cu l a r ind iv idua l . Ihey must become 
phases in the l i f e of a S p i r i t which l ives and dies da i ly 
in the r e l ig ious community. Ihe death involved i s a death 
of p a r t i c u l a r i t y , which covers both the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of sense 
and the p a r t i c u l a r i t y of i n t e r e s t and impulse, and a rev iva l 
to un ive r sa l i t y . I t i s a lso the death of a l l imaginative 
r e l i g ious presenta t ions , and a rev iva l to a more inward, 
not ional form of rel igiQus experience. The death of the 
Mediator must be appropriated by the re l ig ious community. 
With t h i s d isso lu t ion of the Mediator in the communal 
consciousness wi l l go to the death of the divine Essence, 
as something abs t r ac t and apar t . Therefore, Hegel says t ha t 
' t h i s hard saying i s the esqpression of the inner most simple 
2 5. F. Hegel, Phenomenology, p . 780. 
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knowledge of self, the re turn of consciousness i n to the 
deep night of 1=1, tha t can no more d is t inguish or know 
anything outside of i t s e l f . therefore, we may say tha t 
the ult imate fa te of a l l imaginative re l ig ious presenta t ions 
i s to hand over the i r majesty and author i ty to self-conscious 
S 'pir i t . Ihe r e l ig ious community does not r ea l i ze tha t how 
revolut ionary i t i s . I t fee l s i t s union with the Divine in 
the form of love and affect ion. Henceforth, Hegel has vei led 
h i s treatment of Religion in much orthodox-sounding language, 
however i t s outcon» i s very c l ea r . In a l l i t s forms theism 
i s an imaginative d i s to r t i on of f ina l t r u t h . The God outside 
of us who saves us by His grace, i s a misleading graphic 
expression for saving forces inherent to self-conscious s p i r i t . 
And the religio.us approach must be transcended in the f ina l 
i l luminat ion . I t would be wrong to regard Hegel as a humartist 
because he has not deposed God in order to put Man, whether 
as an individual or group of individuals , in His p lace , Ihe 
self-conscious S p i r i t which plays the p a r t of God in h i s 
system i s not the complex, but the impersonal, which more 
and more takes over the individual , and becomes manifest 
and conscious in him. Therefore, we may conclude tha t Hegel 's 
25. Ib id . , p . 782. 
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re l ig ion , l ike t ha t of Ar i s to t l e s , which cons i s t s in 
s t ra in ing every nerve to l ive in accordance with the 
27 best thing in us . Thus, the Absolute Religion i s the 
r e l ig ion of Truth and Freedom,, i . e . , Chr i s t i an i ty , 
according to Hegel, Here t ruth means tha t the mind does 
not take up such an a t t i t ude to the objective as would 
imply tha t t h i s i s something foreign to i t . IVhile freedom 
brings out the r e a l meaning of t ru th and i s the e s s e n t i a l 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of self-consciousness. 
27; J,N. Findlay, Hegel; A Re-examination, p . 143, 
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(c) Ihe JRelatlonsMp between Religion and ghllosophy; 
Religion occupies a peculiar position in the philosophy 
of Hegel, However, as pointed out earlier, according to Hegel, 
Philosophy as a whole and in its parts is determined by its 
object. Philosophy always has a definite form of individuality 
to deal with. The Supreme object of philosophy is reality as 
the absolutely individual whole and the evolution of its 
content is the systematic development of the Absolute Idea, 
Ihe various divisions and sub-divisions of the philosophical 
system, finite mind, nature, etc. are dealt with this ultimate 
reality. Iheir content is evolved in detail as moments of the 
supreme ttuth, and therefore gives rise to the various parts 
of the absolute philosophy, the various philosophical sciences. 
A philosophical Science deals with the systematic evolution 
of the real in terms of its notion. However, the real is a 
28 
whole of parts and a unity of diverse elements. 
But as far as religion is concerned, it is not an 
object in the sense of sphere of reality. However, we may 
say that it is an attitude towards an object and the only 
form of that object possible is either the Absolute or some 
specific sphere of the Absolute. Hegel maintains that the 
28. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 6, p. 584. 
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object of the r e l ig ious a t t i t u d e s i s the Absolute in i t s 
completeness, in i t s xanity and in i t s t r u t h as wel l . But 
ul t imately t h i s r e a l i t y i s a lso the \anique sphere of 
pMlosophy, o r speculat ive Science and such speculation i s 
very much necessary and su f f i c ien t to give the complete 
t r u t h about the Absolute. 
According to Hegel, ' t he object of re l ig ion as T ^ I I 
as of philosophy i s e ternal t r u t h in i t s ob jec t iv i ty , God and 
nothing but God, and the expl icat ion of God. Philosophy i s 
not a wisdom of the world, but i s knowledge of what i s not of 
the world, i t i s not knowledge which conceims external mass, 
or empirical existence and l i f e , but i s knowledge of tha t 
which i s e t e rna l , of what God i s , and what flows out of His 
na ture . For t h i s His nature must reveal and develop i t s e l f . 
Philosophy, therefore , only unfolds i t s e l f when i t unfold 
re l ig ion , and in unfolding i t s e l f i t unfolds re l ig ion" .^^ 
But fur ther we face a d i f f i cu l ty t ha t i t cannot be 
said tha t the Absolute m Philosophy i s not the same as the 
Absolute in r e l i g ion . Hegel 's system i s agains t such a viev/. 
He says tha t the Absolute in Philosophy i s forcibly iden t i f i ed 
with God in re l ig ion , and in the highest re l ig ion there i s not 
29. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. I , 
p . 19 
122 
even the l ikeness of con t ras t . Ihe Absolute i s the Supreme 
t ru th and the supreme t ruth i s one. Now the solution of 
t h i s d i f f i cu l t y i s foiond by Hegel in drawing a d i s t i nc t i on 
in 
between form'/which the Absolute i s grasped in the case 
of r e l ig ion and of philosophy, and the ' con ten t ' which they 
both deal with, Ihe ' content ' i s exactly the same while the 
•form' i s d i f fe ren t in the two cases . Ihe same Absolute i s 
present in both and in the same sense, e .g . as self-consciousness, 
s p i r i t / and n a t i o n a l . I t s method of r ea l i za t ion i s the saire, 
v i z . i t i s 'conscious of i t s e l f in the speculat ive philosophy 
as well as in the r e l i g ious mind. But the medium through 
which i t s r ea l i za t i on i s effected, the 'form' in which the 
' content ' i s expressed, i s in r e l ig ion tha t of feeling^of 
sensuous i n tu i t i on , whereas in philosophy the 'form' i s tha t 
3Q 
of the notion qua-notion. 
However, t h i s solution only r a i s e s a further 
d i f f i c u l t y . We have seen that the notion i s the f ina l form 
in which t ruth appears and the notion alone i s wholly 
adequate to convey absolute t r u th . Ihere i s no doubt t ha t 
Hegel s view i s tha t the r e l i g ious 'form' i s not in i t s e l f 
completely adequate to the e s s e n t i a l nature of Absolute Spir i t^ 
30. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics , vo l . 6, p . 584. 
123 
and that the religious •form' calls for and is compelled by its 
own 'dialectic' to pass to the Suprene form, in which truth is 
embodied the notion. Hence, in Hegel's view, philosophy, and 
not religion, is the highest expression of self-conscious 
Spirit, and that speculation is the final stage and 'crown' of 
the life of Spirit.^^ 
Further Hegel says that the "religion and philosophy 
come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it 
is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective 
notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God. 
Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinc-
tion is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from 
the manner of looking at things which is commonly called 
religion as such, what they have in common is, that they are 
religion; what distinguishes them from each other is merely 
the kind and manner of religion we find in each. It is in 
the peculiar way in which they both occupy themselves with 
God that the distinction comes out. It is just here, however, 
that the difficulties lie which appear so great, that it 
is even regarded as an impossibility that philosophy should 
be one with religion. Hence comes the suspicion with which 
philosophy is looked upon by theology, and the antagonistic 
31. Ibid., pp. 584-5. 
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attitude of religion and philosophy , In accordance with 
this opposite attitude philosophy seems to act injuriously, 
destructively upon religion, and the way in which it occupies 
itself with God seems to be positively different from 
religion. Ihis opposition is, however, held to be a recognised 
fact than that unity of religion and philosophy just insisted 
upon. 
Now as Hegel main ta ins t h a t i f i t i s p o s s i b l e to 
convey the t r u t h about the Absolute i n the form shich i s the 
essence of the Absolute , i . e . , s e l f - c o n s c i o u s reason , then 
r e l i g i o n i s s i t tp ly the way of e r r o r . On the o the r hand, i f 
r e l i g i o n i s no t the way of e r r o r then the c la im o t phi losophy 
to express the f i n a l t r u t h about the Absolute i s un tenab le , 
because the Absolute d e s i r e s to expres s i t s e l f i n the sphere 
of f e e l i n g , i n t u i t i o n as wel l as through the n o t i o n . Therefore, 
r e l i g i o n i s i n s t r i c t n e s s unnecessary, and phi losophy i s a l l 
t h a t Ood r e q u i r e s t o convey His t ru t i i t o f i n i t e s p i r i t . 'While 
on the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e , r e l i g i o n i s necessa ry and phi losophy 
has no c la im to p r i o r i t y of va lue over r e l i g i o n , xiither 
ph i losophy f u l f i l l s a purpose d i f f e r e n t from r e l i g i o n , or 
phi losophy i s no t by i t s e l f the h i g h e s t and completely concre te 
33 
express ion of the Absolu te , 
3 2. F.Hegel, Lec tures on the fh i losophy of Re l ig ion , v o l . I , p .20 . 
33., Encyclopaedia of Re l ig ion and E t h i c s , v o l . 6, p . 585. 
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In r e l ig ion and pure speculation we have before us 
what the Absolute S p i r i t i s in and for i t s e l f and how i t 
a r t i c u l a t e s i t s e l f , riegel says tha t "Religion i s not conscious-
ness of th i s or tha t t ru th in ina iv iaua l objects^ out of the 
absolute t ru th , of t ruth as the Universal, the All-cort^srehending 
outside of which there l i e s nothing a t a l l . Ttie content of i t s 
consciousness i s further the Universally True, which e x i s t s on 
i t s own accoxont or in and for i t s e l f , which determines i t s e l f , 
34 and i s not determined from without". Therefore, we may say 
tha t the re l ig ion i s the self-consciousness of God, not simply 
how f i n i t e s p i r i t i s conscious of God, but how the Absolute 
S p i r i t i s conscious of i t s e l f in f i n i t e s p i r i t . The Absolute 
S p i r i t manifests i t s e l f in man, which openly reveals i t s very 
na ture . Similarly, speculative philosophy i s the sel f -conscious-
ness of the Absolute S p i r i t and the notion of Absolute Mind 
a r t i cu l a t i ng i t s e l f to i t s e l f and to f i n i t e mind. Therefore, 
the system of notions cons t i tu t ing thesubstance of the 
Absolute Reason i s the thought of God as He was or i s in the 
beginning. So the self-manifestat ion in re l ig ion and the 
s e l f - a r t i c u l a t i o n in speculative sciences, both proceed from 
the same f>pirit. 
Now we arr ive a t the conclusion after viewing the 
above that Hegel 's e f for t s to draw a l ine between re l ig ion and 
34. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vo l . I , p , 22. 
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philosophy i s vac i l l a t i ng ra ther than to be fixed. Because a t 
one time v« find ir^^r. a r t t reated as a p a r t of r e l ig ion and 
a t aB«-tiier time the same re4igAaii t rea ted as separate from 
a r t . Again, r e l ig ion i s regarded as independent of philosophy, 
and a t another time re l ig ion i s t reated as an introduct ion to 
philosophical t r u th . Similarly, a t one time, r e l ig ion i s a 
phase of philosophy, a t another philosophy i s a phase of 
re l ig ion , because philosophy, too, i s the service of Go4. 
Heligion was accepted as a fac t of h i s to ry and i t s natiire 
had to be traced to i t s source in the Absolute. In the re l ig ious 
l i f e , f i n i t e s p i r i t claims to be impart with Absolute S p i r i t . 
Similarly, we may s-ay tha t re l ig ion , in Hegel 's view, i s a 
conscious r e l a t ion of f i n i t e s p i r i t to the Absolute as s p i r i t . 
Hegel 's view of philosophy required him to prove tha t such 
communion a r i ses from the necessary procedure of Absolute 
S p i r i t and that i t was a stage in the evolution of the 
Absolute Idea as explained by Philosophy. 
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(d) The concept of Spi r i t as Self-consciousness of Universal form i 
In t h i s chapter, we shall take up Hegel's notion of 
Gelst, which i s soroetimes translated as 'Mind*, but which i s 
perhaps more aptly t ransla ted as 'Spi r i t* , as the central notion 
in terms of which his system may be understood. In so far as 
Hegel gives a name to the central notion of his system, he 
more often refers to i t as the Idea, or the Absolute Idea, than 
' S p i r i t ' , The idea of Spi r i t i s the Jcey to Hegel's philosophy. 
Let us begin our study of the notion of Geist with 
a few c i ta t ions from Hegel's actual wri t ings . Ifegel remarks 
in the Phenomenology » 'The spir i tual alone i s r ea l . I t i s 
the essence, what ex i s t s in i t se l f . I t contains i t s e l f and 
becomes determinate, i t becomes other-being and being-for-
i t se l f , and, in a l l t h i s determinateness and external i ty to 
self, i t remains in i t s e l f . I t i s in and for i t s e l f . This 
being-in-and-for-i tself i s at f i r s t merely for us, or in i tself* 
i t i s merely Spiri tual Substance, But i t must also become th i s 
for i t s e l f . In other words, i t must become an object to i t se l f , 
but one also in which t h i s objectivity i s forthwith overcome, 
35 and reflected into i t s e l f . ' Or again* 'The l iving substance 
i s tha t being which i s t ru ly subject, or what i s the same 
which only i s t ru ly real in so far as i t i s the movement 
35. Hegel, Phenomenology, P. 86, 
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of posi t ing i t s e l f , or in mediating between becoming-other-than 
self and i t s e l f . I t is* as Subject, than pure and simple Nega-
t i v i t y , which s p i r t s ttp.wliat^ssiicple,an<r dupl icates anci 
opposes things to one another, but which a t the same time also 
negates t h i s ind i f fe ren t d ive r s i ty and opposit ion. True Being 
i s nothing but t h i s se l f - r e s to r ing Iden t i ty , t h i s r e f l e c t i o n -
in to-seI f - in -o ther -be ingI i t i s not an o r ig ina l unity as such, 
not immediate as such. I t i s i t s own becoming, the c i r c l e which 
presupposes i t s end as i t s purpose and i tsbegining, and which 
i s actual in the end, in being carr ied o u t ' . Or again; ' In 
i t s e l f tiie divine l i f e i s no doubt undisturbed i d e n t i t y and 
unity with i t s e l f , which does not take ser ious ly e i ther other-
being or a l iena t ion , or the overcoming of e i t h e r . But t h i s 
only i s the case from an abs t rac tedly universal standpoint, 
which forgets tha t the nature of th i s l i f e i s to be for i t s e l f , 
and which therefore ignores the self-movement inherent in i t s 
form*. Or l a s t l y : ' I t i s of supreme importance in my view tha t 
the true should not merely be conceived and expressed as 
. 3 6 Substance, but as 4»ubject as well*. 
Similar ly in the Lesser Logic, Hegel says of S p i r i t : 
' Ihe l i f e of S p i r i t in i t s immediacy appears as innocence and 
naive confidence, but the very essence of S p i r i t implies tha t 
36. Hegel, Phenomenology, pp. 80-2. 
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this immediate condition should be superseded. For sp i r i tua l 
l i fe i s d is t ingui^ed jErom natural, and part icularly from 
animal, l i fe in this , that i t does not merely remain in i tself , 
but i s for i t se l f . This standpoint of severance roust, however, 
i t se l f be overcome: Spir i t must, through i t s own act, returned 
to a unified s t a t e , . , Though i t i s that in f l i c t s the wounds and 
37 
that heals them too*. ' Or again: 'Nature i s by no means some-
thing fixed and finished for i tse l f , which could also exist 
without Spi r i t : rather does i t f i r s t reach i t s aim and truth 
in Spi r i t . Just so S p i r i t on i t s part i s not merely something 
abstractly beyond nature, but exists trtjiy- and shows i t se l f 
to be sp i r i t , in so far as i t contains nature as subjugated 
30 in i t s e l f . Or again: 'To think the necessary i s to resolve 
i t s hardness, i t i s the encountering of one's own in the other 
AS something existing for self this liberation may be 
* • • 
called "I", as completely developed it may be called Free 
39 
Spirit, as experience Love, as enjoyment Blessedness'. Or 
again: *The movement of the Notion must be treated as if it 
were a game: the other that it postulates is in reality not 
40 
another', Or lastly: "Ihe Idea is the central seeing of itself 
(From Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Science^) 
37. Hegel, Lesser Logic/ tr. by Wallace, 1892, pp. 54-55. 
3e, Ibid., p. 180. 
39, Ibid., p, 285, 
40, Ibid,, p. 289. 
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in the other, the notion tha t has carr ied i t s e l f out i n to 
object ivi ty* the object whose inner purposiveness i s e s s e n t i a l 
41 
subjec t iv i ty* . 
Likewise in the Bhilosophy of s p i r i t we read the 
follow£ngi 'For us S p i r i t has Nature as i t s presupposit ion, 
whose Truth, and absolute Prius i t therefore i s . In t h i s Truth 
Nature has vanished, and S p i r i t has revealed i t s e l f as the Idea 
brought to i t s Being-for-self, whose Object as much as Subject 
i s the Notion, atiis iden*J,ty>is absolute negat iv i ty , because 
the Notion has i t s complete outward ob jec t iv i ty in Nature, 
but t h i s i t s ex terna l iza t ion i s done away with, and i t has 
become iden t i ca l with sel f in the l a t t e r . But i t i s only t h i s 
42 i d e n t i t y in so far as i t has come back out of Nature ' , Or 
again: *Tt\e essence of S p i r i t i s for t h i s reason formally Freedom 
the absolute negat iv i ty of the Notion as iden t i t y with se l f . 
According to th i s formal determination i t can absract from 
everything external including i t s own ex te rna l i ty , i t s ex is tence . 
I t can endure the negation of i t s individual immediacy, the 
i n f i n i t e anguish, i . e . i t can preserve i t s e l f a t f i rmat ively in 
t h i s negat iv i ty , and be iden t i ca l with se l f . Ih i s p o s s i b i l i t y 
. 43 i s i t s abs t rac t un iversa l i ty as i t i s for i t s e l f . Or l a s t l y / 
41.. I b id . , p . 356. 
42. F. Hegel, Hiilosophv of Sp i r i t , t r . by William Wallace, 
1894, p . 163. 
43. Ibdd., p . 163. 
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S p i r i t i s the i n f i n i t e Idea^ and f in i tude has there the meaning 
of ttie inadequacy of the concept and r e a l i t y , with the added 
deterndnation tha t i t i s an appearance within i t s e l f - a n 
appearance which S p i r i t i rapl ic i te ly before i t s e l f as a ba r r i e r , 
in order tha t , by removing the l a t t e r , i t may have and know 
freedom for i t s e l f as i t s own essence ' , ' 
Iherefore, in a l l these passages we find the same 
p ic tu re of what can only be ca l led a mystical game. S p i r i t i s 
i n f i n i t e , but i t must lay claim to i t s e l f to be f i n i t e . I t a lso 
pretends to d is t inguish i t s e l f from everything f i n i t e and to 
become ful ly aware of i t s own i n f i n i t y . S p i r i t i s the only 
r e a l i t y , but i t must confront i t s e l f with something seemingly 
a l ien , in order to see through i t s own self-decept ion, to 
become aware tha t i t i s the only r e a l i t y . In fact , s p i r i t i s 
not merely the goal of i t s own game, but i s indis t inguishable 
from tha t gan« i t s e l f . Ihese proposi t ions are familiar enough 
in mystical l i t e r a t u r e . 
Now af ter going through the above passages, in which 
Hegel has se t forth h i s paradoxical concept of S p i r i t , we must 
give a more systematic account of the notion, in a manner which 
does not depart too far from Hegel 's own . 
4^* Ib id . , p . 165. 
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F i r s t of a l l , we may say t h a t for Hegel S p i r i t means both 
the o b j e c t and the s u b j e c t of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s . I t i s what 
e x i s t s when the re a re not merely o b j e c t s of varying types — 
embodying in e x t e r n a l i z e d form no t i ons of which they a re 
vmconscious—but i n which t he re a re a l s o consc ious exper iences 
and r e f e r e n c e s d i r e c t e d to such o b j e c t s , and which e x i s t s i n 
even more e x p l i c i t form when the re no t only a re such consc ious 
r e f e r e n c e s , bu t a l s o the r e f l e x sense of the s o r t of a c t i v i t y 
and the s e l f which pervades them all—and which a l s o , according 
to Hegel, l i e s behind t h e i r objects-Jwhen t h i s a c t i v i t y and 
t h i s s e l f a r e n o t merely behind the scenes or i n themselves , 
b u t a l s o ioecome mani fes t or for themselves . For Hegel, s p i r i t 
i s what I r e f e r t o by the pronoun ' I ' , what I am aware of when 
I e n t e r most i n t i m a t e l y i n t o myself, when I am not merely 
absorbed in ray commerce with d e f i n i t e o b j e c t s , but am a l s o 
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aware of myself as a c t i v e i n dea l i ng with them. 
However, Hegel says t h a t the ' I ' or ' S e l f which i s 
consc ious , and which we dea l with i n s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i s 
no merely de t e rmina te , p a r t i c u l a r be ing . No doubt I am a 
p a r t i c u l a r person , e . g . Marcus Aure l ius , son of Antoninus 
Pi Us, Pr inceps of the Roman iJinpire, e t c . I am furn i shed with 
d e f i n i t e de t e rmina t ions and occupy a d e f i n i t e p o s i t i o n i n space 
and in world h i s t o r y . I am a l so surrounded by o the r t h ings and 
4 5 , J . N . F indlay , Hegel: A Re-examination, p . 39 . 
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person similarly circumstanced. However, the '1' of which I am 
conscious in self-consciousness is not tied down to any such 
single position or set or determinations. Therefore, whatever 
or wherever it is, it could always have been elsewhere or 
otherwise, Hegel calls this 'I' as the absolute negativity of 
the notion. According to Hegel, 'It can endxire the negation 
of its individual immediacy, the infinite anguish, i.e. it can 
preserve itself affirmatively in this negativity and be identical 
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with self*. Therefore, we may say in short that there is 
nothing that I cannot set before myself in thought. Ihere is 
also no situation or set of properties into which I cannot 
think myself, without needing to sacrifice my identity.lt is 
through this power to take on, or to lay aside, any and every 
thinkable determination that my spiritual identity is established. 
Hegel refers In this connection to the implicitly, universal 
meaning of the pronoun 'I*. 
However, for Hegel, the 'I* revealed in self-conscious-
ness is not some mysterious Substance, which lies behind all 
my conscious activities. Hegel is quite free from the neo-
realist picture of conscious life as a aystem of 'search-light^-
of which certain primary ones are trained upon objects, while 
other secondary beams are trained on these primary beams, and 
4$. F, Hegel, Philosophy of Spirit, p. 163. 
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can perhaps succeed in l ight ing up thei r sorirce as wel l . For 
Hegel the s p i r i t u a l ' I* of self-consciousness must be conceived 
as a Subject^ but not as a ^ b s t a n c e . In fac t , i t cannot be 
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separated from i t s conscious and self-conscious a c t i v i t i e s . 
Now we s t a t e tha t what Hegel did mean by the 'conscious-
ness" of which S p i r i t i s the O b j e c t . As we said, i t i s not the 
i l luminat ion of an unchanged object by a metaphorical search 
l i g h t t rained on i t from without. I t i s ra ther a process in 
which an object yields up a universal meaning or unifying 
pa t te rn of which i t i s an ins tance . Such universals or pa t t e rns 
ex is t : in na tura l objects in an unconscious 'pe t r i f i ed* form: 
the i r disengagement, and the ranging of objects under them, i s , 
however, an a f fa i r of 'consciousness*, and in fact , consciousness 
i s no more for Hegel than j u s t the disengagement of such 
xiniversals and p a t t e r n s . For there to be the consciousness of 
something, tha t thing must to some extent depart from the mutual 
ex t e rna l i t y of existence in time and space, and from the hard 
def in i teness of sense. ^Therefore, for Hegel, consciousness may 
be described as the ' s e l f - ac t iva t ing Universal ' or as the 
'Universal in action* (das sichbep^ato'iigonde/^llgemeine or das 
48 that ige Allgemeine). I t i s the a c t i v i t y which disengages 
47, J.N. Findlay, Heqelt A re-examination, p . 40, 
48. F. Hegel, L. Logic, p . 36. 
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universa l i ty and unity from p a r t i c u l a r i t y and plxiral i ty, and 
which i n t e r p r e t s the l a t t e r through the former. 
Tine ' S e l f , the Subject, which i s conscious seems to 
mean no more for Hegel than t h i s same universal iz ing or unifying 
a c t i v i t y , described by a somewhat misleading substant ival 
speech. Iherefore, for Hegel, the pronoun ' I ' has i t s root 
meaning in the linity and universa l i ty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a l l 
conscious experience. To say tha t I am self-conscious i s 
accordingly to say no more than tha t t h i s act ive un ive r sa l i ty 
disengaged, 
i s i t s e l f through i t s own ac t i v i t y , from the speci f ic 
a c t i v i t i e s in which i t i s operat ive, and becomes manifest as 
the Universal i t i s , t ha t i t ceases to operate obscurely in 
other ejcperiences, but becomes e x p l i c i t , for i t s e l f . In 
disengaging un iversa l i ty from anything. S p i r i t i s in a sense 
disengaging ' i t se l f* from such a thing, and accomplished 
s p i r i t u a l self-consciousness i s merely a more e x p l i c i t form 
49 of the same process . 
Ihe natiare of S p i r i t as the se l f - ac t ive Universal 
makes i t reasonable for Hegel to c a l l i t ' i n f i n i t e ' . He c a l l s 
i t t h i s , not as being capable of indef in i te extension, but 
in the special Hegalian sense of being self-contained and 
49. J.N, Findlay, Hegel; A Re-examination, pp. 41-2. 
136 
conplete. It is this infinity because it can deal with nothing 
without drawing out a universal or pattern from it, i.e. without 
making it similar to itself. It has also this infinity because 
it can come into contact with nothing that is not a condi-tion 
of its own activity and of its own self-awareness. And, having 
this infinity, this 'absolute negativity'. Spirit is also by its 
nature impersonal or suprapersonal. For Hegel, Spirit is in fact 
most fully manifest in the various intersubjective normSwhich 
raise conscious experience above what is merely personal and 
finite, in the categories and canons of logic and science, the 
rules of legal and moral behaviour, of aesthetic taste. Further, 
Hegel thinks that the whole content of these norms follows 
from the 'infinity' and the freedom of Spirit. Hegel says, in 
Logic, the mind is 'in its own home element and therefore free', 
such freedom meaning that it 'never leaves itsown ground, but 
gives the law to itself, but in which it also 'renounces its 
selfish and particular being, and sinks itself in the thing'. 
Similarly, the whole content of morality and legality springs 
from the unlimited freedom of the p\ire 'self*. 
But though Spirit must thus be regarded as 'infinite', 
entirely free and suprapersonal, it must also be regarded as 
finite, bounded and personal. There is a logical connection 
5t». F. Hegel, L. Logic, p. 49. 
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between i t s having the former properties and i t s having the 
l a t t e r . This l ies in the fact that the vmiversality and unity 
of sp i r i t i s essentially active and conscious, ^B may say tiiat 
being active i t must have something to act upon, and being 
conscious i t roust have something by contrast with which i t can 
be conscious of what i t i s . Ihe 'absolute negativity ' of s p i r i t 
would be nothing if there were nothing for i t to negate nor 
could i t be suprapersonal if there were no personal differences 
for i t to transcend. Therefore, i t i s essential for Sp i r i t to 
be wedded to particular f ini te contents and to determinate places 
in the world, as i t i s for i t to be freely ranging and ' in f in i te^ 
since i t i s only by being the former that i t can be l a t t e r . And 
i t i s as essential for sp i r i t to assume the form of particular 
persons, identified with private interest , as i t i s for i t to 
be impersonal, disinterested and 'publ ic ' , Ihis may appear 
superficially as a contradiction,but quite obviously i t i s not, 
since we are dealing with different aspects of the same 
' r e a l i t y ' , Olierefoxe, sp i r i t may perhaps better be described 
as what i s infini te-in-fini tude, or inpersonal-in-being-personal, 
than what i s merely inf ini te and impersonal. Hegel^ therefore^ 
gives a place to the ordinary use of ' I ' as referring to the 
particular f ini te person, who i s certainly not an "impersonal 
'World-Spirit '.^^ 
5 X. J.N. Pindlay, Heqej; A Re-examination, pp. 43-4. 
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I t i s further characterist ic of Hegel's notion of sp i r i t 
that i t i s inpossible to separate the activi ty or process of 
evercomlag the various forms of other-being/ from the self-
consciousness which resul ts from this process. Tt\e self-conscious 
Spir i t i s a resul t of the submission of otherness in the 
sense of having the la t ter as a necessary condition. I t i s not a 
resu l t in the sense that i t exis ts after th is submission«^^ 
Finally, we may say that tiie crowning point in the notion 
of sp i r i t i s the only or the absolute rea l i ty . Hegel ca l ls i t 
'the True', or the "Truth of everything'. By this Hegel means 
that one can only understand anything adequately in so far as 
i t i s seen as a stage towards, or as a condition of, the emergence 
of the self-conscious ^ i r i t . The highest stage in the self-
consciousness of Spi r i t i s the sirnple realization that i t i s the 
' t r u th ' of everything, Ihis stage of self-consciousness i s called 
by Hegel the 'Absolute Idea*. Concretely i t i s achieved in certain 
experiences of aesthetic creation i . e . Art/Of religious devotion 
i . e . . Religion, and of philosophical illumination i . e . , Hiilosophy. 
In this Absolute Idea or Absolute Spir i t error and finitude do not 
disappear but they are merely 'overcome*. 
52. Ibid., p . 46. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The Implications of Hegel's Philosophy of Religion : 
When we begin to examine the implicat ions of Hegel 's 
philosophy of Religion for Philosophy, Mysticisra and Art , we see 
t ha t the issue impinged upon i s mainly the r e l a t i ons of s p i r i t 
with Nature. As we know, Hegel Indicates how S p i r i t separates 
i t s subjective l i f e from the ob jec t iv i ty of external Nature. 
However,Spirit must not merely shape the world to i t s w i l l . 
I t must a l so see the world as having no other function but to 
be so shaped. I t must envision i t s e l f as the ' t r u t h ' of 
everything. I t wil l enjoy t h i s v i s ion immediately and sensuously 
in Art^ emotionally and representa t ive ly in Religion, and 
speculat ively in Philosophy, these being the three forms of 
Absolute S p i r i t or Mind, These are b r i e f ly sketched by Hegel 
in the Encyclopaedia, but are a l so worked over in his three 
courses of l e c t u r e s on Aes the t ics , on the Philosophy of Religion 
and on the History of Philosophy. 
Art , the f i r s t form of Absolute S p i r i t , according to 
Hegel, expresses the Idea in an 'immediate' manner, through 
material given to the senses, A work of Art does not s t a t e 
t ha t self-conpciou? S p i r i t I s the t ruth of everything, but i t 
shows how, what i s non-sp i r i tua l can be taken up and overcome 
in S p i r i t . I t therefore prepares us for the higher int imations 
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of Religion and Philosophy, Hegel maintains t ha t works of a r t , 
althougn -t-hey are not thoughts and not ions , have the power of 
thinking s p i r i t in them. For t h i s reason the work of Art i s 
a manifestation of thought ex te rna l i s ing i t s e l f , and therefore 
belongs to the realm of understanding, thought and S p i r i t , in 
so f a r a s i t i s amenable to ra t iona l treatment in the form of 
aes the t i c c r i t i c i sm. However, i t i s not the highest form the 
S p i r i t can a t t a i n . 
Hegel s t r e s ses the curious fusion of sense and meaning 
which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of works of Art. To appreciate a Work 
of Art i s not merely to percieve separately i t s sensual content 
and the idea represented, but to i n t u i t t h e i r harmonious union 
as an organic whole. For t h i s very reason a successful work of Art 
makes i t impossible to separate these two elements in our perce-
pt ion. I t compels us to rea l i ze i t s symbolic charac ter in r e l a t i on 
to r e a l i t y . I t i s evident from t h i s t ha t Hegel i s re ject ing the 
representat ional theory of Art in favour of a symbolic approach. 
The corol lary of t h i s approach i s tha t Art has a Truth d i s t i n c t 
from ' a c t u a l i t y ' or f ac t . Here, we can see Hegel an t ic ipa t ing 
some of the most s ign i f i can t developments in Aesthet ics and Li terary 
theory which have culminated in t h i s century. 
Fur ther , the symbolising function of Art i s a l so an 
ideal iz ing function. I t pu r i f i e s the actual and presents fonns 
in t h e i r ideal s ignif icance. 
1^ 1 
From h is general treatment of the Idea l , or Aesthetic 
Idea, Hegel passes on to a Philosophy of Ar t -h i s to ry , as well 
as to a Philosophy of var ious Art-forms, Ar t -h is tory i s studied 
under the three headings of Symbolic, Classic and Romantic Ar t , 
According to Hegel, Symbolic Art covers the luxurious and 
f a n t a s t i c , which for him a r e , however, formless and t a s t e l e s s . 
With c h a r a c t e r i s t i c Eurocentrism, Hegel clubs a l l o r ien ta l Art 
under t h i s category. I t i s an Art which s t r a i n s in vain a f t e r 
the ideal of s p i r i t u a l self-envisagement. Symbolic Art i s 
sublime Art , in the precise Kantian sense of the word. In 
Classical Art we have t;he highest expression of which, Art qua 
Art i s capable. In Romantic Art , we see Art s t r iv ing to express , 
what i s in f a c t a higher form of s p i r i t u a l l i f e . There must 
always be an Inadequacy, from the poin t of view of s p i r i t u a l 
self-envisagement, in tha t union of ideal meaning and sensuous 
content which i s the aim of d l l Art, I t i s t h i s Inadequacy 
which receives a r t i s t i c expression in Romantic Art . In f a c t , 
Hegel sees the return of the lack of de f in i t ion and measure 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Symbolic Art in Romantic Art. 
We now come to the cent ra l po in t of our concern, 
which i s the t r an s i t i on from Art to Religion, This t^^ansition, 
according to Hegel i s s t r a i g h t forward. In Art the Idea i s 
expressed through a fusion of sense and s ignif icance. But t h i s 
symbolic charac ter i s not su f f i c ien t to express the Idea, 
14^ 
In Religion -^ he Idea receive!? a b e t t e r expression, a so-cal led 
revelation in the Feel ings , I n t u i t i o n s , Presentat ions and 
V/orshipful Actions of the Individual , where a r t i s t i c presen-
t a t ions only play a subordinate ro l e . 
However, for Hegel, Religion and Philosophy both 
have an ident ica l content. According to him a religious -tern 
l i ke *God' wi l l reveal I t s e l f as meaning no more than the ' I ' 
of self-consciousness, which i s inseparable from the f i n i t e 
p a r t i c u l a r self . That i s , God has 'created • the world of 
Nature and f i n i t e s p i r i t , but only in the sense t ha t these 
are the necessary conditions of pure self-consciousness. 
To put i t concisely, God i s God only in so f a r as He knows 
Himself; His self-knowledge i s His self-consciousness in 
Man and hence i s Man's knowledge of God, 
In Hegelsphilosophy of religion, the relationship 
between consciousness as such and the r e l ig ious s e n s i b i l i t y 
has a crucia l ro le . This i s understood in terms of the modes 
such as feel ing and representa t ion . Let us f i r s t look a t the 
mode of fee l ing . According to Hegel, Feelin,? does not mean 
a simple affect ive s t a t e l i k e pleasure or pain, Feeling,»for 
Pfegel i s a fundamental ontological concept denoting a 
consciousness which can be of any object whatever, whether 
simple or comrdex, va l id or de lus ive , which may include 
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subjective a t t i t u d e s , e .g . remorse, but which i s d i f fe ren t 
from a l l other ways of being conscious In t h a t i t exh ib i t s 
a to t a l lack of ana ly t i c c l a r i t y . In p a r t i c u l a r , we may say 
tha t a s t a te of Feel i rg i s one in which there i s no c l ea r 
d i s t i nc t ion between what i s subjesctive and what i s ob;)ective. 
I t i s a mode in which external determinants are appropriated 
in such a way as to par t ly fuse consciousness with what i t i s 
conscious of. Therefore, in the r e l ig ious context , we may say 
tha t the Religious Fee l ing-re la t ionship i s one in which God i s 
appropriated, Ju s t as an ob jec t ' s hardness i s appropriated 
when I feel i t . Therefore, my Feeling consciousness of Grod 
na tura l ly develops into my re f l ec t ive consciousness of God's 
universal being, on the one hand, and my own profound n u l l i t y , 
on the other , and a l so in to var ious a t t i t u d e s of fea r , g r a t i t u d e , 
compassion, e t c . between us. Hegel fu r the r emphasizes t ha t we are 
not more closely in touch with God, when we fee l Him than 
when we think of Him. Hegel bel ieves tha t Feeling due to i t s 
lf=ick of ana ly t i ca l c l a r i t y , may y ie ld us a confused or even 
fa l se p ic tu re of r e a l i t y . I t i s only in thought tha t we 
can apprehend God Validly, and as He absolute ly i s . 
Next l e t us discuss the second mode which i s 
representa t ion. F i r s t of a l l , we must understand tha t represen-
t a t i on i s not exactly the same as an image or mental p i c t u r e . 
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but has the p rec i se ly defined sense of an Image raised to 
the form of universal i ty .Hence, representa t ions have the 
sl:atup of thoughts, despi te t h e i r e s sen t i a l differences 
from mental pic-»-ures. They take whatever notions they deal 
with, l i ke the things in sense, and they t r e a t them as 
external to one another l i k e ex i s t en t s in Space and Time, 
and they merely note the re la t ionsh ip among them, instead of 
gaining ins igh t in to t h e i r necess i ty . In the context of 
Peli^^ion, thought about the anger of God, about the creat ion 
of God's Son, about the Creation of the world, e t c . a l l 
involve th i? representat ional s ty le of p ic ture- thought , to 
eliminate which would be to turn Religion in to Speculative 
Philosophy, 
Hegel a l so has ce r t a in views regarding the h i s t o -
r i ca l development of Religion. According to him re l ig ion has 
passed through various phases, beginning with a magical, purely 
natural stage of Religion, and passing through the Chinese 
Religion of Measure, the Indian Religion of Fantasy ( which, 
needless to add, are extremely simDlis-^-ic depict ions of these 
re l ig ions ) through the Religions of Light (Zoro-astr ianism), 
of suffering (the SyHac) , and of Riddle ( the Egyptian ) , 
to Judaism, Greek Religion (of Beauty), and Roman Religion, 
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F ina l ly , he passes on to Absolute or Revealed Religion, 
Hegel i den t i f i e s th i s stage of Religion with Chr i s t i an i ty . 
Here he deals with 'Kingdom' of the Father and with the 
Kingdoms of the Son and the S p i r i t . Thus the death of 
death involved in the Chris t ian Resurrection and Ascention 
(The ascent of Jesus Christ to heaven on the f o r t e i t h day 
a f t e r His Pe -Su r^c t i on ) i s held to be a representa t ional 
expression of the 'absolute nega t i v i t y ' of S p i r i t , the 
pr inc ip le tha t S p i r i t can affirm i t s e l f only by f i r s t 
denying i t s e l f and then denying tha t denial d i a l e c t i c a l l y . 
However, absurd Hegel 's ideas may appear on the surface, one 
must admit tha t there i s nothing a r b i t r a r y and external in 
Hegel's de ta i l ed explanations. They are cons i s ten t with the 
basic or ien ta t ions of his philosophy. 
However, Religion with i t s p ic ture- thought wil l 
always be involved in incons is tenc ies . I t s speculative content 
wi l l not always accord with i t s representat ion and quasi-
empirical mode of statement. Therefore, i t u l t imately moves 
towards Philosophy, where the abs t r ac t concept i s alone 
capable of becoming a concrete Idea. For Hegel, Philosc^hy 
i s simply the History of Philosophy as res ta ted in the 
medium of pure thought; the supreme achievement of S p i r i t 
i s accordingly to recap i tu la te and understand i t s own 
re f lec t ive h is tory frcm Thales ' i den t i f i ca t ion of the ' a l l ' 
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with water, to Hegel's own iden t i f i c a t i on of i t with 
self-conscious S p i r i t . Hegel a l so maintains t h a t the 
l a s t nhllosophy of an era necessar i ly sums up a l l previous 
stages of philosophy, and in the highest phase, which for 
Hegel i s h i s own system, represents the self-consciousness 
of S p i r i t . 
With reference to his own philosophy Hegel says t ha t 
the World-Spirit has now become free from a l l foreign objective 
essence and i s a t l a s t apprehending i t s e l f as Absolute S p i r i t . 
The struggle of the f i n i t e self-consciousness with the absolute 
self-consciousness, which appeared to the former as outside 
of i t s e l f , ceases. The f i n i t e self-consciousness has ceased to 
be f i n i t e , and the absolute self-consciousness on the other 
hand, has gained the r e a l i t y t ha t i t previously lacked. The 
h is tory of philosophy depic ts t h i s struggle which culminates 
in the at tainment of a c t u a l i t y by the S p i r i t . However, we must 
not imagine tha t Hegel i s claiming f i n a l i t y to h i s own system. 
The claim to refe^^nce of Absolute does not imply i t . I t 
only means tha t upto t ha t po in t , Tru+h can be apprehended only 
in tha t fashion. Therefore, Hegelian Truth, in t h i s context , 
i s a s t r i c t l y contemporarv aff air ,and Hegel expects no more 
permanence for his own system than to be preserved in such 
good Systems as come a f t e r i t . 
Now l e t us t ry to make a few observations about 
After 
He<;el's philosophy in general,/going through the var ious phasei 
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and among d i f fe ren t views p o i n t s , we may say tha t Hegel was 
a-n gnti-metaphysiclan, Empir ic is t , I d e a l i s t and Dia lec t ic ian . 
Hegel 's Philosophy doe? much to sa t i s fy a l l these conceptions 
of Philosophy. I t i s unsat is factory to any of them because 
i t does so much j u s t i c e t o a l l of them. While i t analyses 
ordinary concepts and ways of speech, and leaves them undis t -
urbed a t t h e i r l e v e l , i t a l so subjects them to devastating 
higher- level c r i t i c i sm, while i t allows us to think in a l t e r -
native ways, a t the summit of which there i s only one completely 
sa t i s fac tory mode of conception. I . e . the Absolute Idea, 
Hegel's philosophy i s one of the most antl-metaphyslcal 
of philosophical systems. Hegel often speaks the language of a 
mataphyslcal theology, but such language I s a mere concession 
to the p i c t o r i a l mode of r e l ig ious expression. Now, the claim 
tha t Hegel Is an anti-metaphysician may sound surpr is ing. Let us 
c la r i fy t h i s po in t . Hegel has an ontolc^y. But he has no 
metaphysics in the sense t ha t he does not pos i t any ul t imate 
r e a l i t y , be i t God or Absolute,beyond the experience of human 
individuals . This does not , however, mean tha t He^el I s a mere 
humanist. V/e might say tha t i t i s only through the medium of 
individual human S p i r i t s t ha t h is Absolute can be a t a l l . 
S imilar ly , we may say tha t Hegel shows no tendency to undermine 
or Overthrow the f a c t s , assumptions or methods of the 
mathematical or natural Sciences, This impression conveyed 
14a 
only because Hegel attempts to relate the facts of 
science to a broader speculative perspective, and in 
this attempt, presents the facts in a different l ight . 
Finally, \ie may say that Hegel's philosophy is 
not s t a t i c . I t i s dynamic. I t develops i t s principles and 
modes of inteipretation out of other less developed modes 
and principles. This ' d i a l ec t i ca l ' side to Hegel's philosophy, 
i s a t once the source of scsne of i t s supreme merits and also 
of i t s demerits. 
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